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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Dynamic Pricing
by
Koray Cosguner
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Washington University in St. Louis, 2013
Professor Tat Y. Chan, Chair
Professor P. B. Seetharaman, Co-Chair
In empirical marketing literature, it is well documented that most of the frequently
consumed packaged good categories are governed by inertia that is the phenomenon of
consumers often repeat-purchasing the same brand on successive purchase occasions. Under
such inertial behavior, market-level demand becomes to be correlated over time, i.e., if the
demand of a brand is high in a given week, it is likely to remain high in the ensuing weeks. The
pricing implication of such inertia is, for instance, a current retail price cut for a brand not only
increase its demand in the current week, but also increase its demand in the ensuing weeks
(given that there is no price response from the competitors). Therefore, pricing decisions become
dynamic under inertial demand. Even though the phenomenon of inertia has been widely
documented at the empirical choice domain, the pricing implications of such inertia have been
mostly limited to the analytical area. Therefore, the objective of my dissertation work is to fill
this gap in the dynamic empirical pricing domain.
Normative analytical models of oligopolistic pricing account for the fact that in such
inertial markets, competing manufacturers have, on the one hand, an incentive to price low in
order to invest in building consumer demand for the future, but, on the other hand, an incentive
viii

to price high in order to harvest the reduced price-sensitivity of its existing inertial customers. In
Essay 1 of this dissertation, I estimate a structural econometric model of oligopolistic pricing
and, on that basis, explicitly disentangle the relative impacts of the two opposing, i.e., investing
versus harvesting, incentives on the pricing decisions of cola manufacturers. From our analysis,
we find that the net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives in our data is that the
equilibrium prices of both brands are lower than those in the absence of inertia (by 4.6% and
3.1% of costs, for Coke and Pepsi, respectively).
Over the past decade, the marketing literature has been enriched by the development of
structural econometric models of prices in the distribution channel (Kadiyali, Chintagunta and
Vilcassim (2000), Sudhir (2001), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), Villas-Boas (2007), Che, Sudhir
and Seetharaman (2007), Draganska, Klapper and Villas-Boas (2010)). These models, which
derive the wholesale pricing incentives for brand manufacturers, together with the retail pricing
incentives for retailers, have typically ignored the existence of inertial demand. In Essay 2 of this
dissertation, I advance the literature by developing a structural econometric model of prices in
the distribution channel in the presence of inertial demand. From our analysis, we find that the
net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives in our data is that the channel profit margin
of Coke is lower by 3c, while the channel profit of Pepsi is the same as, the corresponding
margin in the absence of inertia. We also find the retailer effectively free rides on the
manufacturers’ efforts by taking a lion’s share of the additional profits that accrue to the channel
from the existence of inertial demand.

ix

Introduction
Consumers’ brand choice behaviors have been widely studied by marketing researchers
with respect to frequently consumed packaged good products. Within the choice context,
marketing researchers also study the effects of consumers’ current choices on their future
choices. These studies documented that most of the packaged good categories are governed by
inertia that is the phenomenon of consumers often repeat-purchasing the same brand on
successive purchase occasions (Allenby and Lenk (1995), Erdem (1996), Roy, Chintagunta and
Haldar (1996), Keane (1997), Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta (1999), Ailawadi, Gedenk
and Neslin (1999), Erdem and Sun (2001), Moshkin and Shachar (2002), Seetharaman (2004),
Shum (2004), Dube, Hitsch, Rossi and Vitorino (2006)). Such inertial behavior leads to marketlevel demand to be correlated over time, i.e., if the demand of a brand is high in a given week, it
is likely to remain high in the ensuing weeks. The pricing implication of such inertia is, for
example, a current retail price cut for a brand not only increase its demand in the current week,
but also increase its demand in the ensuing weeks (given that no price response from the
competitors). This means the pricing decisions become dynamic once the consumer inertia
exists.
Even though the phenomenon of inertia has been widely documented at the empirical
choice domain, the pricing implications of such inertia have been mostly limited to the analytical
domain. Thus, the objective of this dissertation work is to fill this gap in the empirical pricing
domain.
In the analytical domain, there are many studies modeling the pricing decisions of
manufacturers under inertial demand (Klemperer (1987a, 1987b), Wernerfelt (1991), Beggs and
1

Klemperer (1992)), (Chintagunta and Rao (1996), Villas-Boas (2004), Dube, Hitsch and Rossi
(2009), Doganoglu (2010)). These normative analytical models of oligopolistic pricing account
for the fact that in such inertial markets, competing firms have, on the one hand, an incentive to
price low in order to invest in building consumer demand for the future, but, on the other hand,
an incentive to price high in order to harvest the reduced price-sensitivity of its existing inertial
customers. While some of these papers have emphasized the harvesting incentive (Klemperer
(1987a, 1987b), Wernerfelt (1991), Beggs and Klemperer (1992)), others have emphasized the
investing incentive (Chintagunta and Rao (1996), Villas-Boas (2004), Dube, Hitsch and Rossi
(2009)1, Doganoglu (2010)). Therefore, empirically estimating the pricing decisions of dynamic
manufacturers becomes the next natural step. Essay 1 of this dissertation focuses on this issue,
and complements these existing normative studies. In Essay 1, we estimate a structural
econometric model of oligopolistic pricing and, on that basis, explicitly disentangle the relative
impacts of the two opposing, i.e., investing versus harvesting, incentives on the pricing decisions
in the cola market that is characterized by inertial consumer choices at the demand side.
We find that the cola category is characterized by significant inertia in demand, with
estimated brand-level switching costs of $0.30 and $0.13 for the two consumer segments.
Ignoring the investing incentives in manufacturers’ dynamic pricing, leads to a sizable (~29% for
Coke, ~40% for Pepsi) overestimation, while additionally ignoring the harvesting incentives
leads to a smaller, but still sizeable, overestimation (~19% for both brands), in the estimated
profit margins of cola brands. The net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives in our
data is that the equilibrium prices of both brands are lower than those in the absence of inertia

1

Similar to Essay 1, Dube et al. (2009) uses an empirically consistent demand specification, but they do not have an
econometric estimation of the supply side pricing decisions. Instead of estimating the dynamic pricing decisions as
Essay 1, they solve the dynamic pricing equilibrium numerically given the assumed marginal cost.
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(by 4.6% and 3.1% of costs, for Coke and Pepsi, respectively). We find that each brand’s profit
would decrease by 5 % if it were to engage in myopic pricing when its competitor engages in
dynamic pricing.
In Essay 1, we show that profits of both brands increase with increasing levels of inertia,
with the investing incentive dominating at low to moderate levels of inertia, and the harvesting
incentive dominating at high levels of inertia. We also show that increasing the discount factor
from 0 to 1 initially increases, and eventually decreases, the profits of both Coke and Pepsi.
Finally, we also find that each brand’s profits increase in its own discount factor and decrease in
its competitor’s discount factor, i.e., being infinitely forward-looking is the dominant strategy for
both Coke and Pepsi2.
After understanding the effects of inertia on manufacturers’ pricing decisions, the next
natural step becomes understanding the incentives in a full distribution channel. The marketing
literature has been enriched, over the past decade, by the development of structural econometric
models of prices in the distribution channel (Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (2000), Sudhir
(2001), Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), Villas-Boas (2007), Che, Sudhir and Seetharaman (2007)3,
Draganska, Klapper and Villas-Boas (2010)). These models, which derive the wholesale pricing
incentives for brand manufacturers, together with the retail pricing incentives for retailers, have
typically ignored the existence of inertial demand. In Essay 2 of my dissertation, I advance the
literature by developing a structural econometric model of prices in the distribution channel in

2

The u-shaped relationship between level of inertia and prices has also been shown by the Dube et al. (2009) paper.
However, the result of being forward-looking is a dominant strategy for both Coke and Pepsi is a unique finding of
Essay 1.
3
Che et al. (2007) models the effect of inertia on pricing decisions in the distribution channel by allowing channel
members to be boundedly forward-looking. Therefore, they do not really estimate the fully dynamic pricing game;
whereas Essay 2 relaxes this assumption and models the behaviors of the retailer and manufacturers as infinitely
forward looking.
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the presence of inertial demand. In doing so, we study the relative dynamic pricing implications
– representing the harvesting versus investing incentives of how current price for a brand must
optimally take into account, respectively, past versus future demand for the brand – of such
inertial demand for brand manufacturers versus the retailer. By doing so, we go beyond the
objective of Essay 1, which is how the pricing incentives of manufacturers become different
when there is an independent retailer in the picture. I addition to that, we investigate how the
incentives of the retailer might be different from manufacturers.
We find that the net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives in our data is that
the channel profit margin of Coke is lower by 3c, while the channel profit of Pepsi is the same
as, the corresponding margin in the absence of inertia. We also find that while the benefits of the
harvesting incentive are almost equally reaped by the manufacturers and the retailer, by
appropriately increasing their profit margins, the costs of investing are entirely borne by the
manufacturers, by reducing their wholesale profit margins. The retailer effectively free rides on
the manufacturers’ efforts by taking a lion’s share of the additional profits that accrue to the
channel from the existence of inertial demand.
A counterfactual simulation reveals that all channel members gain from increasing the
level of inertia in the market. The retailer’s gain is disproportionately higher than the gains of the
manufacturers, and this is in large part because the retailer either does not bear, or bears a
relatively minor part of, the increasing costs of investing as the level of inertia increases. Using
another counterfactual simulation, we find that the retailer can improve retail profit by as much
as 11 % by selling its customer database to the cola manufacturers (at an optimal price) and
letting them drop customized price-off coupons to customers belonging to the more price
sensitive (less inertial) segment. Interestingly, by engaging in such behavioral price
4

discrimination, manufacturer profits are lowered, when compared to the case of no price
discrimination. Again, the retailer not only entirely benefits from behavioral price discrimination
at the expense of manufacturers, but also induces the manufacturers to invest the necessary
effort.

5

1 A Structural Econometric Model of Dynamic Manufacturer

Pricing: A Case Study of the Cola Market
1.1 Introduction
When pricing strategies of product manufacturers recognize the future (i.e., long-term)
implications – for consumers and competitors – of their current prices, dynamic manufacturer
pricing is said to exist. Such dynamic pricing incentives often arise in product markets which are
commonly characterized by inertia in consumers’ brand choices over time.4 Inertia refers to the
phenomenon of consumers often repeat-purchasing the same brand on successive purchase
occasions. Such inertial, or habitual, brand choice behavior of consumers, in turn, leads to the
aggregate (e.g., market-level) demand for a brand being positively correlated over time. In other
words, if demand for a brand is high (low) on a given week, it is likely to remain high (low) in
ensuing weeks on account of consumer inertia. A pricing implication of such inertia in demand,
for example, is that reducing the price of Coke in the current week will increase the demand for
Coke not only in the current week but also in the subsequent weeks when the price reduction on
Coke has been retracted (assuming no competitive response in prices from other cola
manufacturers). Thus, Coke faces a trade-off between charging a low price to attract customers
and locking them in, and charging a higher price to extract higher profits from its already lockedin customers. In order to correctly resolve this trade-off when setting price for its brand, Coke
must know both (1) the actual extent of inertia in consumers’ brand choices in the cola market, as
well as (2) the pricing strategies of competing cola manufacturers (such as Pepsi).
Econometrically analyzing historical market-level data on demand and prices of competing cola
4

Economists usually refer to inertia using the term switching costs.
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brands will shed light on (1) and (2). Doing this is the objective of this study. In doing this, the
research contribution of our paper is that it estimates a structural econometric model of dynamic
pricing decisions of manufacturers in the presence of inertia in consumers’ brand choices. Using
our estimation procedure, we can study the empirical relevance of various pricing implications
that have emerged in the rich analytical literature on normative models of dynamic oligopolistic
pricing (which will be explained in detail the next section).
We estimate a consumer-level brand choice model, which includes the effects of inertia,
using scanner panel data on cola brand choices of consumers in a local market over a period of
two years. We then estimate a manufacturer-level oligopolistic pricing model using retail
tracking data on store-level prices of cola brands from the same local market over the same
period of two years. Using a two-segment brand choice model, we find that the cola category is
characterized by significant inertia in demand, with estimated brand-level switching costs of
$0.30 and $0.13 for the two consumer segments. Not accounting for such inertia in brand choices
leads to seriously mis-estimated sensitivities of cola demand to marketing mix variables.
We find that ignoring the investing incentives in manufacturers’ dynamic pricing, as
represented in our dynamic pricing model, leads to a spurious overestimation in the estimated
profit margins of 29 % and 40 % for Coke and Pepsi, respectively. Ignoring both the investing
and harvesting incentives leads to a spurious overestimation in the estimated profit margins of 19
% for both brands. Estimating a mis-specified demand model without inertia and using it as an
input for a static pricing model leads to estimated profit margins that are slightly lower than
those implied by the static pricing model that simply sets the inertia parameter to zero among the
estimated parameters yielded by a demand model with inertia.

7

The net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives in our data is that the
equilibrium prices of both brands are lower (by 4.6 % and 3.1 % of costs, for Coke and Pepsi,
respectively) than those in the absence of inertia. In other words, the harvesting incentive -which increases equilibrium prices of Coke and Pepsi by 2.3 % and 4.2 %, respectively -- is
dominated by the investing incentive -- which decreases equilibrium prices of Coke and Pepsi by
6.9 % and 7.3 %, respectively -- for cola brands. We find that each brand’s profit would decrease
by about 5 % if it were to engage in myopic pricing while its competitor engages in dynamic
pricing.
A counterfactual simulation reveals that increasing the discount factor from 0 to 1
initially increases, and eventually decreases, the profits of the two brands. Another
counterfactual simulation reveals that each brand’s profits increase in its own discount factor and
decrease in its competitor’s discount factor. A third counterfactual simulation reveals that the
investing incentive to pricing dominates at low to moderate levels of inertia, while the harvesting
incentive dominates at high levels of inertia. However, profits of both brands steadily increase
with inertia.

8

1.2 Literature Review
In this section, we review three streams of pertinent literature. First, we review the
literature on statistical and econometric models of inertial demand. Second, we review the
literature on game-theoretic models of dynamic pricing in the presence of inertial demand. Third,
we review the emerging literature on structural econometric models of dynamic pricing in the
presence of inertial demand.

1.2.1 Statistical and Econometric Models of Inertial Demand
Inertia refers to the positive effect of past purchase of a brand on the consumer’s current
probability of buying the brand. It can be understood to arise out of consumer habits formed on
the basis of prior consumption experiences. One of the early statistical models of inertia in
consumers’ brand choices was proposed by Jeuland (1979), and other statistical models of inertia
have been subsequently proposed and estimated over the years (see, for example, Kahn, Kalwani
and Morrison (1986), Colombo and Morrison (1989), Bawa (1990), Fader and Lattin (1993),
Givon and Horsky (1994), Gupta, Chintagunta and Wittink (1997), Seetharaman and
Chintagunta (1998), Seetharaman (2003)).
In recent years, especially since the seminal study of Guadagni and Little (1983),
econometric models have largely displaced statistical models5 in being employed to estimate the
extent of inertia in consumers’ brand choices over time (see, for example, Allenby and Lenk
(1995), Erdem (1996), Roy, Chintagunta and Haldar (1996), Keane (1997), Seetharaman, Ainslie
and Chintagunta (1999), Ailawadi, Gedenk and Neslin (1999), Erdem and Sun (2001), Moshkin
and Shachar (2002), Seetharaman (2004), Shum (2004), Dube, Hitsch, Rossi and Vitorino
5

The distinction between statistical and econometric models is that the latter are grounded in economic theory
(Hood and Koopmans 1953).
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(2006)). An empirical generalization that has emerged in this literature is that inertia
overwhelmingly governs consumers’ brand choices in packaged goods categories.
In the presence of inertia, a managerial question that arises pertains to the long-term
effectiveness of pricing. Seetharaman (2004) shows that ignoring inertia underestimates the total
incremental impact of a price reduction by as much as 35%. This suggests that the reduced profit
margin for a brand during a period of price reduction may be offset by increases in brand volume
not just during the period of promotion but also in future periods. But this finding is predicated
on the assumption that competitive price responses from other brands are absent. In reality,
however, price changes on a brand would have not only direct effects on its sales, but also
indirect effects through the changes triggered in competitive brands’ prices. Therefore, a gametheoretic analysis of price competition between manufacturers in markets with inertia would be
warranted. We review the existing literature on this subject next.

1.2.2 Game-Theoretic Models of Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of Inertial
Demand
Klemperer (1987a) derives the normative pricing implications of demand inertia in an
undifferentiated duopoly using a two-period game-theoretic framework, and shows that the noncooperative pricing equilibrium in the second period is the same as the collusive outcome in an
otherwise identical market without inertia. In other words, two competing firms in a mature
market characterized by inertia – each firm with an installed base of customers from the previous
period – face demand functions that are relatively price inelastic compared to their counterparts
in an otherwise identical mature market without inertia. This decreased price elasticity reduces
the price rivalry among the firms, leading to higher prices for the brands of both firms.
Klemperer (1987a) also shows that the pricing power that the two firms gain in the second period
10

leads to vigorous price competition in the first period, which may more than dissipate the firms’
extra monopolistic returns from the second period. In other words, in the early growth stages of a
market characterized by inertia, competing firms would engage in fierce price competition to
build market shares for their brands.
Klemperer (1987b) shows that the central implications of Klemperer (1987a), discussed
above, also apply for a differentiated duopoly. Klemperer (1987b) also extends the modeling
framework to allow for rational (i.e., “forward-looking”) consumers, and shows that first-period
prices of the two firms become less competitive because consumers who realize that firms with
higher market shares will charge higher prices in the future are less price elastic than naïve
consumers.
The two-period game-theoretic models of Klemperer (1987a, 1987b) do not tell us what
to expect from price competition over many periods when old (locked-in) customers and new
(uncommitted) customers are intermingled and firms cannot discriminate between these groups
of customers. Will firms’ temptation to exploit their current customer bases lead to higher prices,
or will firms’ desire to attract new customers lead to lower prices than in the case of no inertia?
In order to answer this question, Beggs and Klemperer (1992) extend the duopoly pricing model
of Klemperer (1987b) to the infinite period case, where new customers arrive and a fraction of
old consumers leave in each period. Beggs and Klemperer (1992) show, over a wide range of
parametric assumptions, that firms obtain higher prices and profits compared to those in the
absence of inertia. The authors find that prices rise as (1) firms discount the future more, (2)
consumers discount the future less, (3) turnover of consumers decreases, and (4) the rate of
growth of the market decreases.

11

In contrast to the discrete-time, game-theoretic framework adopted by Beggs and
Klemperer (1992), Wernerfelt (1991) adopts a continuous-time, game-theoretic framework to
study price competition between firms in inertial markets. Consistent with the findings in Beggs
and Klemperer (1992), Wernerfelt (1991) also derives higher equilibrium prices for firms, as
well as a positive effect of the extent of firms’ future discounting behavior on equilibrium prices,
in inertial markets. This shows that the equilibrium pricing results are robust to whether the
game-theoretic pricing models are solved in discrete or continuous time.
As in Wernerfelt (1991), Chintagunta and Rao (1996) also study the normative pricing
implications of demand dynamics using a continuous-time, game-theoretic framework. In
contrast to Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and Wernerfelt (1991), the authors show, using the
estimated extent of inertia in a consumer packaged goods category, that dynamic pricing
strategies of firm that recognize the long-run impact of their current prices lead to prices that are
100-200% lower than those implied by myopic pricing strategies. In other words, the incentive to
the firm of pricing low to invest in building consumer demand for the future overwhelms the
incentive to the firm of pricing high to harvest the reduced price sensitivity of its existing inertial
customers (while the latter incentive dominates in the models of Beggs and Klemperer (1992)
and Wernerfelt (1991)). The authors also show that in the presence of demand inertia, the firm
with the higher baseline preference level will charge the higher price in steady state.
Dube, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) and Doganoglu (2010) obtain normative pricing
implications of demand dynamics that are similar to those in Chintagunta and Rao (1996) using
discrete-time (as opposed to continuous-time), game-theoretic frameworks. In Dube, Hitsch and
Rossi (2009), the dynamic equilibrium is numerically solved for using the estimated inertial
demand functions for the orange juice and margarine categories. The authors show that the prices
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in the presence of inertia are about 18% lower than the myopic prices in the absence of inertia.
Doganoglu (2010) analyzes a dynamic duopoly and shows that when switching costs are
sufficiently low, the prices in the steady state are lower than what they would have been when
they are absent.
Villas-Boas (2004) analyzes the case where demand inertia in consumers’ brand choices
endogenously arises out of consumers learning about how well different brands fit their
preferences. Using a two-period game-theoretic framework with two firms, Villas-Boas (2004)
finds that if the distribution of consumer valuations for each product is negatively skewed, a firm
benefits in the future from having a greater market share today. This is an outcome of forwardlooking firms competing more aggressively on prices despite the decreased price sensitivity of
forward-looking consumers arguing for higher prices than under the myopic case.
To summarize, dynamic pricing strategies for firms facing inertial demand, as derived in
the above-mentioned game-theoretic models, are based on resolving the trade-off to the firm
between two opposing pricing incentives: on the one hand, the firm has the incentive to price
high in order to harvest the reduced price sensitivity of its existing inertial customers; on the
other hand, the firm has an incentive to price low in order to invest in building consumer demand
for the future. Which effect dominates the other depends on modeling assumptions. While some
papers have emphasized the harvesting incentive (Klemperer (1987a, 1987b), Wernerfelt (1991),
Beggs and Klemperer (1992)), others have emphasized the investing incentive (Chintagunta and
Rao (1996), Villas-Boas (2004), Dube, Hitsch and Rossi (2009), Doganoglu (2010)).
In contrast to pricing strategy, which is the focus of the above-mentioned literature,
Freimer and Horsky (2008) examine the connection between demand inertia and the offering of
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price promotions by competing firms in a duopoly. The authors show that for some commonly
used price response functions, the existence of demand inertia, at a level of intensity consistent
with that identified in empirical research, makes it optimal for competing brands to periodically
offer price promotions. It is also shown that competing brands should promote in different
periods as opposed to head to head.
Recent advances in econometrics make it possible to estimate the game-theoretic models
of dynamic pricing discussed above. We review the emerging literature on this subject next. In
fact, this paper adds to this emerging literature stream.

1.2.3 Structural Econometric Models of Dynamic Pricing in the Presence of
Inertial Demand
Estimable econometric models of dynamic pricing in the presence of inertial demand
require both (1) the solution of discrete-time, stochastic dynamic optimization problems for each
firm, where a firm chooses from a continuum of possible prices, and (2) the fixed point to the
game-theoretic problem of multiple firms employing their best pricing responses to each other’s
pricing choices, to be accommodated in the estimation. Such models, referred to as structural
models of dynamic pricing in the presence of inertial demand, therefore, present significant
computational challenges.
Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003), referred to as KKV henceforth, derive a dynamic pricing
model using the first-order conditions of an oligopolistic firm, which is engaged in Bertrand
price competition with other firms, in a market with inertial consumers. The firm is assumed to
maximize the present value of their lifetime profits, as opposed to just single-period profits. The
price-cost margin thus derived includes an additional term beyond that derived under the single-
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period profit maximization case (as in, for example, Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)). This
additional term represents the benefit to the firm from capturing customers in the current period
that will be “locked in” during future periods, an effect that the myopic pricing model would
ignore. Therefore, while the myopic pricing model only presents the incentive to the firm of
pricing high to harvest the reduced price sensitivity of its existing inertial customers, the
dynamic pricing model additionally presents the opposing incentive to the firm of pricing low to
invest in building consumer demand for the future. In order to empirically uncover the realized
trade-offs between the two opposing incentives for firms, Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) estimate
their dynamic pricing model using data on aggregate market shares and price-cost margins of
banks. They find that the harvesting incentive dominates the investing incentive for firms in their
data. Using a non-structural (i.e., descriptive) pricing model, Viard (2007) finds that decreased
levels of inertia, induced by deregulation of the telecommunications industry, decreased prices
for toll-free services offered by AT&T and MCI, again seemingly consistent with the harvesting
incentive dominating the investing incentive for firms in their data.
Che, Sudhir and Seetharaman (2007), referred to as CSS henceforth, derive a dynamic
pricing model using the first-order conditions of an oligopolistic firm, which is engaged in price
competition with other firms, in a market with inertial consumers, under two alternative
assumptions: (1) Firms engage in Bertrand price competition, (2) Firms engage in tacit price
collusion. They estimate the two dynamic pricing models using price data from the breakfast
cereals industry. The authors find that omission of inertia in demand biases the econometrician’s
inference of manufacturer pricing behavior, i.e., one erroneously infers tacit pricing collusion
among breakfast cereals manufacturers when firms are, in fact, competitive. Unlike Kim, Kliger
and Vale (2003), who consider infinite future periods, Che, Sudhir and Seetharaman (2007)
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assume that the firm is forward-looking over a finite number of periods. The authors then find
that a two-period dynamic pricing model better explains the observed retail prices of cereals
brands than does the one-period myopic pricing model of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), as
well as a three-period dynamic pricing model. In other words, they show that breakfast cereals
manufacturers are boundedly rational, in terms of how far in to the future they look while setting
current prices.
While both KKV and CSS represent pioneering research on the estimation of structural
econometric models of dynamic pricing in the presence of inertial demand, both papers make
restrictive assumptions for the sake of computational convenience (Seetharaman 2009). While
KKV rely on estimating steady-state pricing equations, CSS, despite correctly estimating nonstationary pricing equations, assume a limited time horizon (three periods) of planning for the
manufacturers. This assumption is made mainly for computational reasons. In this study, we
propose both a fully structural dynamic pricing model, as well as an estimation technique that
enables us to recover its parameters. In this sense, we make a key methodological advance to the
literature on dynamic pricing. We apply our structural econometric model of dynamic pricing to
the cola market. To reiterate, we propose and estimate, for the first time in the literature, a fully
structural econometric model of dynamic pricing in the presence of inertial demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our structural
econometric model of inertial demand, as well as the associated estimation procedure. In the
third section, we present our structural econometric model of dynamic manufacturer pricing in
the presence of inertial demand, as well as the associated estimation procedure. Section 4
presents the estimation results from applying our proposed structural econometric models of
inertial demand and dynamic manufacturer pricing on scanner panel data from the cola market.
16

In Section 5, we discuss the managerial implications of our estimation results based on some
counterfactual simulations. Section 6 concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
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1.3 Structural Econometric Model of Inertial Demand
To develop a structural econometric model of brand choice with the no-purchase option
for scanner panel data in the cola category, we recognize that the typical household h (h = 1, 2,
…, H), which is observed over t = 1, 2, …, Th shopping trips, either buys or does not buy one of
J cola brands. On any given shopping trip, we observe an outcome variable yht that takes the
value j (j = 0, 1, 2, …, J). When yht = 0 it means that the household does not purchase in the cola
category during shopping trip t6. Further, during each shopping trip of a household, we observe
the price (Phjt), display (Dhjt), and feature (Fhjt) covariates that the household faces, regardless of
whether the household purchases in the cola category. Our econometric approach models the
multinomial outcome yht as explained next.
Let Uhjt denote the (indirect) utility of household h for brand j at shopping trip t7. We
assume that we can express this utility as a function of the entire set of brand-specific covariates,
(Phjt, Dhjt, Fhjt), as well as the household’s lagged brand choice outcome, which represents the

6

The reason the no-purchase decision is treated as one of the J+1 options is entirely due to computational
convenience. However, there is no priori reason to believe that using a different treatment of the outside good will
systematically change our results for the supply side analysis. In addition to that, this specification is consistent with
the other studies in the structural empirical pricing domain (Sudhir (2001), Che et al. (2007), Dube et al. (2009),
etc.).
7
Here our assumption is households are myopic utility maximizers. However, we acknowledge that households
might be forward-looking in their brand choice behaviors. If that is the case, households make their choices by
maximizing their present discounted sum of utilities from a longer time horizon rather than maximizing a single
period utility. There can be multiple sources of such forward-looking behavior. For example, if the inertia is not
exogenous as assumed here, i.e, if households can control inertia, households can be forward-looking. Even though,
that is a possibility, the behavioral literature on inertia (Howard and Sheth (1969)) excludes this kind of strategic
behavior. That literature documents inertia as the routinized and low-involvement purchase behavior of households.
This definition assumes households as boundedly-rational decision makers. Therefore, given the behavioral
explanation of inertia, assuming households to be strategic becomes internally contradictory. Another source of
forward-looking behavior might be the stockpiling behavior of households. In this case, consumers might have
expectations about future prices and promotions, and they can change their purchase decisions by taking these
expectations into consideration. For example, they might order more today and stockpile for the future if there is a
promotion. In the same line, they might postpone their purchases if they expect a price promotion in the upcoming
periods. Although this kind of strategic behavior is quite possible and well documented in the literature, we do not
see significant evidence of such purchase acceleration and stockpiling behavior in our data set (see Appendix 3).
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brand that was most recently purchased by the household, also referred to as the household’s
state variable, sht, as follows.

U hjt   hj  1h Phjt   2 h Dhjt  3h Fhjt  h I [ Sht  j ]   hjt ,

(1)

where αhj, j = 1, 2, …, J, are the household’s brand intercepts, βh = (β1h, β2h, β3h) are the
household’s marketing mix sensitivities, I[A] is the indicator function that takes the value of 1
when event A occurs and the value of 0 otherwise, and λh is the household-specific inertia
parameter.8 We assume that the random errors  ht 

  h1t ,  h 2t ,

,  hJt  are distributed iid

Gumbel with location 0 and scale 1.
Let Uh0t denote the (indirect) utility of household h for the no-purchase option (also
called “outside good”) 0 at shopping trip t. We assume that we can express this utility as follows.

U h 0t   h 0t .

(2)

We assume that the random error  h 0t is distributed iid Gumbel with location 0 and scale 1.
We determine the multinomial outcome yht in the usual way: by the principle of
maximum utility. We observe the outcome yht = j when the utility of the jth option to the
household exceeds that of the remaining options. This yields the following probabilistic model
for brand choice.

Phjt 

 hj  1h Phjt   2 h Dhjt  3 h Fhjt  h I [ Sht  j ]

e

J

,

1  e

 hk  1 h Phkt   2 h Dhkt  3 h Fhkt  h I [ Sht  k ]

(3)

k 1

8

This coefficient is more generally referred to as the state dependence coefficient, and captures inertia only when it
takes positive values; it captures variety seeking when it takes negative values. In this paper, we will refer to the
state dependence coefficient as the inertia parameter for expositional convenience since it only takes positive values
in our cola dataset.
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which has the familiar Multinomial Logit (MNL) functional form. This inertial demand model,
which has been used, for example, by Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta (1999), captures
inertia as a first-order behavioral phenomenon, i.e., only the household’s most (and not the
second-most, third-most etc.) recent brand choice influences its current brand choice
probabilities. This assumption is reasonable given that past research in packaged goods
categories has demonstrated that higher-order lagged brand choices capture little additional
explanatory variance beyond the most recent lagged choice outcome, in terms of explaining
current brand choices of consumers (see, for example, Kahn, Kalwani and Morrison 1986,
Seetharaman 2003 etc.).
The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate the parameters  = ({αhj, j = 1, 2,
…, J}, {βh = (β1h, β2h, β3h)}, λh) for each of H households.
Following the latent class approach of Kamakura and Russell (1989), we assume that
households belong to M segments. This simplifies our empirical objective to estimating the
parameters  for each of M segments (rather than H households), as well as the associated
segment sizes. This is done by maximizing the following sample log-likelihood function (which
has a convenient closed-form expression).9
H
M
 Th J
Yhjt  
ln L   ln    m   Pmjt   ,
 m1

h 1
 t 1 j 1



where

m

(3)

 [0, 1] stands for the size of segment m, and Pmjt is the conditional MNL probability

(obtained by replacing subscript h with subscript m in equation (3)) of household h buying brand
9

Unlike the random coefficients logit model, the latent class logit model yields convenient closed-form expressions
for aggregate-level brand demand functions (as will be explained in the next section). Further, Andrews, Ainslie and
Currim (2002) show that the latent class logit model yields aggregate estimates of brand demand, as well as holdout
demand forecasts, that are just as accurate as those yielded by random coefficients logit models.
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j at shopping trip t, given that household h belongs to segment m. Since households usually
undertake shopping trips at weekly intervals, we will interchangeably use t, for expositional
purposes, to refer to shopping trip or week.
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1.4 Structural Econometric Model of Dynamic Manufacturer Pricing in

the Presence of Inertial Demand
To develop a structural econometric model of manufacturer pricing for retail prices in the
cola category, we recognize that each manufacturer j (j = Coke, Pepsi) sets a price for its brand
during each of t = 1, 2, …, T weeks in the data.10 During each week, we observe an outcome
variable Pjt > 0 for each manufacturer. Our econometric approach models the continuous
outcome Pjt as explained next. We do this in two steps. We first derive a predictive model of
aggregate-level brand demand, which is an aggregation of individual-level brand demand, as
derived in the previous section. We then embed this predictive model of aggregate-level brand
demand within a dynamic pricing game among manufacturers.

1.4.1 Predictive Model of Aggregate-Level Brand Demand
Let Sjtm denote a state variable that represents the (segment-specific) installed base for
brand j during week t. This installed base variable represents the number of consumers in
segment m, as of week t, whose most recent brand choice in the cola category is brand j. Further,
let Stm  ( S1mt , S2mt ,..., S Jtm ) represent the vector of installed base variables across all J brands during
week t. The following equation, called the state equation, captures the evolution of the state
variable, Sjtm, from week t to week t+1.
J
J


S mj ,t 1   S ktm Prtm ( k  j )  S mjt  1   Prtm ( j  k ) ,
k j
 k j


10

(4)

While there are 4 brands – Coke, Pepsi, Royal Crown, and Private Label – in the cola category, we endogenize the
prices of only the two major brands – Coke, Pepsi – in the empirical analysis. This is done for computational
convenience. The prices of Royal Crown and Private Label are treated as exogenous to the analysis.
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where Prtm (k  j ) stands for the switching probability, for a consumer in segment m, of
switching from brand k to brand j, and is given by
 mj  1 m Phjt   2 m Dhjt  3 m Fhjt

e

Pr (k  j ) 
m
t

 mk  1 m Phkt   2 m Dhkt  3 h Fhkt  

1 e

J

 e

 ml  1 m Phlt   2 m Dhlt  3 h Fhlt

.

(5)

l k

Equation (4) represents how the installed base of brand j changes from week t to week t+1. This
happens in two ways (as represented by the two terms on the right-hand side of the equation):
one, customers currently in the installed bases of the other brands ( Skt m ) switch to the installed
base of brand j by buying brand j in week t, which happens with probability Prtm (k  j ) , as
shown in equation (5); two, customers currently in the installed base of brand j ( S jt m ) continue
being in the installed base of brand j, by either repeat-purchasing brand j, or choosing the nopurchase option, in week t, with the collective probability of the two events being
1   k  j Prtm ( j  k ) ).
J

Given the state equation (4) governing the evolution of the state variable, S jt m ,
aggregate-level brand demand for brand j in week t, Djt, is given by
M

D jt    m * D mjt ,

(6)

m 1

where Djtm stands for segment-level demand for brand j in week t in segment m, and is given by
J

D mjt   Sktm * Prtm (k  j ).

(7)

k 1

This completes our discussion of the predictive model of aggregate brand-level demand. In
summary, aggregate brand-level demand for brand j in week t is predicted using equation (6),
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which, in turn requires equation (7) as an input, which, in turn, requires equations (4) and (5) as
inputs. The unknown parameters in these equations – which include all parameters in equation
(5), as well as the parameter

m

in equation (6) -- are estimated using household-level scanner

panel data, as explained in the previous section.

1.4.2

Markov-Perfect Equilibrium of the Dynamic Pricing Game
Let Cjt denote the marginal cost of the manufacturer for brand j during week t. It is

written as

C jt  C j  jt ,

(8)

where Cj stands for a time-invariant marginal cost component (such as average production cost),
and νjt is a time-varying cost shock (due to time-varying supply shocks, changes in raw material
prices etc.) that is known to the manufacturer (but not to the researcher). We assume that νjt is iid
N (0, j2) across all j and t. Let νt = (ν1t, ν2t, …, νJt)’.
During week t, each manufacturer is assumed to choose the price for their brand, Pjt, with
the objective of maximizing the discounted present value of their brand profit over an infinite
horizon. This current price, Pjt, will not only influence the current demands of brands, Djt, but
also change the installed bases of all brands in all consumer segments, S jt m , which, in turn will
affect the future stream of profits of, as well as future strategic interactions among, all
manufacturers. All manufacturers are assumed to have full information about the current
installed bases of all brands in all consumer segments, St 

 S

1t

m



,..., S Jt m  ; m  1,..., M '  S , as

well as the current cost shocks associated with all brands,  t  Z . The observed (by the
researcher) state vector, St, evolves according to the state equation (4) given earlier. In this set-
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up, the cost shocks of manufacturers,  t , do not affect the observed states, St, directly. Instead,
the cost shocks,  t , have transitory effects on manufacturers’ payoffs by affecting their pricing
decisions. In other words, as in Rust (1987), we assume that the observed states, St, and
unobserved states,  t , are conditionally independent. The probability transition of the state
variables can, therefore, be written as follows.

F  S ', ' | S , , P   Pr  S ' | S , P  * F  ' .

(9)

We assume a discrete-time, infinite-horizon framework (with t = 1, 2, …, ), with
manufacturers making simultaneous pricing decisions in each period (week), and playing a
repeated Bertrand game with discounting. Under these assumptions, the single-period profit for a
manufacturer is given by

 j ( Pt , St , t )  ( Pjt  C j  jt )* D j ( Pt , St ).

(10)

Conditional on the current states, St and  t , the manufacturer is assumed to maximize the
following expected discounted sum of single-period profits.
 

V j ( St ,t )   j ( Pt , St , t )  E    k t  j ( Pk , Sk , k ) | St , t  ,
 k t 1


(11)

where the expectation is taken over all competing manufacturers’ current actions, all future
values of observed and unobserved states, and all future actions of all manufacturers. We also
assume that all manufacturers have a common discount factor,

< 1.

We focus our attention on Pure-Strategy Markov-Perfect Equilibria (MPE), noting that
there could be multiple such equilibria. In our case, a Markov strategy for a manufacturer
describes their pricing behavior during week t as a function of current states, St and  t . Formally,
25

each manufacturer’s strategy can be written as  j : S x Z  Pj   for j = 1, 2, …, J, where Pj is
J

the price charged by manufacturer j. Let P = (P1, P2…, PJ)’ and     j . The Markov profile
j 1

 : S x Z  P is a MPE is there is no manufacturer j that prefers an alternative strategy  j '
over  j , when all other manufacturers are choosing their strategies according to   j . This can
be formally written as follows

V j ( S , |  j ,   j )  V j ( S , |  j ',   j ), j, S ,  j '.

(12)

Given that the behavior is a Markov profile, for each manufacturer i, the discounted sum
of profits can be written in the form of the following Bellman equation.
Vi ( S , )  sup Pj  i ( S , , P)    Vi ( S ', ' | P )d Pr( S ' | S , , P )dF ( ').

(13)

1.4.3 Estimation of the Dynamic Pricing Game
The objective of the estimation is to estimate the marginal cost structure ({Cj,

j}

j = 1,

2, …, J}). In order to achieve this, since the continuation values, V j ( S , ) , in equation (11) is not
known, one first needs to compute the continuation values of the dynamic game for each
candidate cost structure. The conventional way of doing this is to compute these continuation
values as a fixed point to a functional equation (Rust (1987)). Then, the implied behavior by
these continuation values is needed to be matched with the observed behavior. In order to do
that, one needs to change the cost parameters until obtaining a close match between the implied
and observed behaviors. This requires the fixed point calculation to be repeated hundreds, if not
thousands of times. Therefore, the computational burden makes it impossible to use the fixed
point algorithm for estimating most dynamic oligopoly games.
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Recent literature in industrial organization has emerged proposing techniques to
substantially reduce the abovementioned computational burden. The new techniques offered to
use the observed data to calculate the continuation values without ever computing the fixed point
(Hotz and Miller (1993), Berry and Pakes (2001), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007)). However,
relying on data to obtain continuation values is not a silver bullet. Despite mitigating the
computational burden, obtaining continuation values efficiently requires large data sets creating
another challenge to the researcher.
To avoid these pitfalls, we develop a new method to estimate our dynamic pricing game.
Our method preserves the benefits of both the fixed point algorithm and the two-step algorithms,
while addressing their drawbacks. We explain our estimation method next.
We parameterize manufacturers’ pricing policies as flexible functions of state variables, S
and , as shown below.
Pˆj ( j )  f j ( S , |  j ),

(14)

where Pˆj ( j ) denotes the parametric approximation of the optimal pricing policies of
manufacturer j, f j (.) is a flexible function (such as a high order polynomial approximation), and

 j is a vector of parameters characterizing this flexible function. Given the policy function
above, as well as the structural parameters, the expected continuation values, E 'V j ( S ') , which
are represented by the second term on the right-hand side of equation (11), can be computed
using forward simulation (see Appendix 1 for details). We take the derivative of the value
function in equation (11) with respect to price (from the parametric approximation) in order to
construct the first-order conditions, as shown below.
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V j ( S , )  
D
E 'V j ( S')
j
 D j  ( Pj  C j  j ) *
*
 0.



P
P
P
j

j

j

(15)


P


 
where P
j
j ( S , ) , D j  D j ( S , P ) , S '  S ( S , P) . This first-order condition is different from
that which corresponds to myopic profit maximization on account of the last term, i.e.,

*

E 'V j ( S')
 , on the next period’s
. This term captures the influence of the current price, P
j

P
j

state, S' , and, therefore, on the expected continuation value, E 'V j ( S') , of the next period. This
,
term captures the investing incentive of the manufacturer toward lowering the current price, P
j

in order to raise the next period’s state, S' . In the absence of this term, the only effect of inertia
in demand will be reflected in the harvesting incentive, which is reflected in the second term,
  C  ) *
(P
j
j
j


D
j
. The derivative, with respect to price, of the expected continuation value of

P
j

the next period,

E 'V j ( S')
, can be obtained using chain rule, as shown below.

P
j

E 'V j ( S') E 'V j ( S')  S'
*
.


'

P


S
P
j
j

(16)

Rearranging terms, we can write the first-order condition for the optimal price P* as below.
1

   

   * E 'V j ( S ')    D j  .
Pj * ( S , )  C j   j   D
 
j

P

   Pj 
j

(17)

If the policy function in equation (14) is optimal, for any given set of state variables, (S,  ), the
computed parametric prices should match the optimal prices from the above equation, after
allowing for approximation error due to the parametric policy functions, as shown below.
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 ( S , |  )  0.
Pj * ( S , )  P
j
j

(18)

In order to recover the structural parameters of interest, i.e., Cj and

j,

we construct the

following two moment conditions.

E[ j | S ]  0, E[ j 2 | S ]   j 2  0,

(19)

where νj is obtained using the optimality condition for manufacturers, i.e., equation (17), as
shown below.
1


E V j ( S ')   D j 
 j  Pj  C j   D j   *  '
 .

Pj

  Pj 

(20)

where P is the observed price in the data, D j  D j ( S , P) , S '  S '( S , P ) . The GMM estimator, as
applied in the literature, typically relies on the first moment only. In our case, in order to identify
the cost shock variance parameter, j, we additionally use the second moment, as shown in
equation (19). A second point of departure of our estimation approach from the GMM estimator
that is typically used in the literature lies in equation (18). Given a set of state variables, (Sq , q ) ,
q = 1, …, S, our estimates are obtained by minimizing not only a criterion function that is based
on the moment conditions in equation (20), but also the following “penalty” function.
S

  P
q 1

j

*

2

 ( S , |  )  .
( Sq , q )  P
j
q
q
j 

(21)

At the true policy functions and true values of model parameters, the moment conditions in
equation (20) will be satisfied, while the approximation error in equation (21) will be minimized.
Our estimation approach is similar to a constrained optimization method (MPEC),
recently developed by Su and Judd (2011). The MPEC approach also imposes equilibrium
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conditions instead of using the fixed point calculation. The MPEC approach minimizes a GMM
criterion function subject to the imposed equilibrium constraints by using constrained
optimization techniques. For each trial set of parameters in the numerical search, the MPEC
approach treats the continuation values (at each state combination, (S, ν)) as a parameter. Our
approach is different from the MPEC approach in the following ways: first, our approach uses
equilibrium conditions with penalty functions, as shown in equation (21), which do not require
 ( S , |  ) , and the equilibrium
exact matches between the parameterized policy functions, P
j
q
q
j
 ( S , |  ) ,
policies, Pj* ( Sq , q ) . This is because we treat the parameterized policy functions, P
j
q
q
j

as approximations, that are allowed to deviate from the optimal policies even at true values of
parameters. Second, under our approach, only the θj’s are additional parameters to be estimated,
while under the MPEC approach, V (S, ν) for all S and ν in the state space, are additional
parameters to be estimated. This implies the number of parameters to be estimated under our
approach is much smaller compared to the MPEC approach.
It is also worthwhile to compare our approach with Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007,
hereafter BBL) and Berry and Pakes (2001, hereafter BP). As a first step, the BBL approach
estimates the policy functions for various state points in the observed space. Then, with these
estimated policy functions, they forward simulate the continuation values of manufacturers. By
embedding this simulation exercise in a numerical search routine we can estimate the cost
structure of our manufacturers. The major limitation associated with this estimation approach is
that the sampling error inherent in the first step may be severe. This is especially the case if there
are insufficient observations to represent all possible points in the state space. This is indeed the
case in our dataset, in which we only have about 100 weekly observations for each manufacturer.
This sampling error, in turn, would adversely impact the efficiency of the marginal cost
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parameters estimated in the second step. In addition, the BBL approach is inapplicable with
multiple unobserved state variables, as in our case, where each manufacturer’s pricing decision
depends on the cost shocks of all manufacturers. Therefore, adapting the BBL algorithm to
estimate our dynamic game becomes infeasible.
Another approach designed to estimate dynamic games like ours is the BP approach.
Similar to our proposed approach, BP also use estimation equations derived from first order
conditions for the firms’ continuous controls. However the implementation of each approach is
quite different. First of all, to approximate the continuation values for a given marginal cost
structure, BP uses the observed time series data; whereas our approach uses forward simulation
by using the parametric policy functions (whose parameters are estimated along with the
structural parameters). This means our approach has a much lower data requirement compared to
BP. The benefits of this are threefold: unlike the BP approach, 1) the sampling bias due to small
data size is no longer an issue for us; 2) the use of forward simulation allows us to average out
and get consistent estimates of the continuation values; 3) the truncation error problem no longer
exists for our approach, because we do not rely on data to calculate continuation values, thus the
length of the time series data does not pose a limitation to our approach.
The asymptotic distribution of our estimator is difficult to derive and even it has a closed
form, it is likely to be difficult to calculate (as in BBL). Therefore, we use the following
bootstrapping procedure to calculate the standard errors:
1. We draw θDs, s = 1, 2, …, ns, from the asymptotic normal distribution of the demand

ˆ D , ˆ D ) , where 
ˆ D stands for the estimated demand
model parameter estimates, N (
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parameters, and ˆ D stands for the estimated covariance matrix of the estimated
demand parameters.
2. We obtain bootstrapped data, (Pts, Sts, s = 1, 2, …, ns), by drawing independent,
random samples, with replacement, from the original data.
3. We re-estimate the parameters of the structural econometric model of dynamic
manufacturer pricing for each bootstrapped draw of the original data (from Step 2
above), while generating the evolution of states, S, as well as the demand function, D,
based on each bootstrapped draw of the estimated demand model parameters (from
Step 1 above).
4. Using the estimated pricing model parameters from Step 3 above, across all
bootstrapped draws, we calculate the standard errors associated with those estimates.
Below, we summarize the benefits of our estimation method for multi-agent problems.
1. It is easy to implement and uses the forward simulation idea;
2. It can be used for problems where multiple unobserved states (cost shocks, in our
case) enter the policies of economic agents (manufacturers, in our case);
3. It can flexibly model policies as a function of numerous state variables, without being
constrained by the number of state space points reflected in the data (unlike BBL);
We conduct a series of Monte Carlo simulations in order to study how well our proposed
estimation approach can recover the model parameters under a wide range of assumed structural
parameters, i.e., high versus low average cost, high versus low cost shock, using a sample size
similar to ours. We also allow for monopoly versus duopoly scenarios in the simulation. Under
each tested case in our simulations, we find that the estimates of Cj and j and are very close to
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their true (assumed) values. The results are reported in Appendix 3. This Monte Carlo simulation
exercise gives us confidence regarding the efficiency of our proposed estimator.
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1.5 Empirical Results
We use scanner panel data from Information Resources Incorporated’s (IRI) scannerpanel database on cola purchases of 356 households making 32942 shopping trips at a
supermarket store in a suburban market of a large U.S. city. The dataset covers a two-year period
from June 1991 to June 1993. The supermarket is a local monopolist in the sense of not having
other supermarkets nearby and, therefore, drawing a loyal core group of shoppers to the same
store for their grocery shopping. Table 1.1 presents some descriptive statistics on weekly
marketing variables and market shares of four major cola brands in the data. The 356 households
are observed to purchase cola during 5784 (17.56%) of their shopping trips. In terms of average
prices, we see that Coke, Pepsi and Royal Crown occupy a high price-tier, while the Private
Label occupies a low price-tier, at the store. In terms of display and feature promotions, we see
that Pepsi is displayed and featured more frequently than the other brands by the retailer. In
terms of average weekly market shares, Pepsi is observed to be the dominant cola brand (with an
average market share of 0.4567), while the Private Label is the smallest brand (with an average
market share of 0.0685).

1.5.1 Estimation Results for the Inertial Demand Model
Table 1.2 presents the estimates of the inertial demand model under the 2-support
heterogeneity specification (which is reported, as well as used as an input for the dynamic
pricing model, for expositional convenience).11 As far as the brand intercepts are concerned, we
find that the private label has the smallest -- most negative -- value of the estimated brand
intercept among the four brands in both segments. This suggests that the private label brand

11

Substantive insights gleaned from our empirical analysis remain similar when the heterogeneity specification is
modified to include additional supports for the heterogeneity distribution. These results are available upon request.
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enjoys the lowest baseline preference in the cola market, which is not surprising considering that
private label brands typically draw sales on account of their lower prices, as opposed to their
relative intrinsic attractiveness, when compared to other (national) brands. Pepsi is found to have
the highest baseline preference among the four brands in both segments, while Coke has the
second highest baseline preference. This is consistent with the institutional reality that Pepsi was
the dominant cola brand in supermarket stores (even though Coke had higher overall national
market share) in the US during the 1990s.
As far as the marketing mix coefficients are concerned, the estimated price coefficient is
negative, as expected, for both segments. This implies that as price of a brand increases, a
household’s probability of buying the brand decreases. The estimated display and feature
coefficients are positive, as expected, for both segments. This suggests that as display or feature
advertising for a brand increases, a household’s probability of buying the brand increases.
Between the two segments, segment 2 (the larger segment, containing 71 % of the households) is
found to be more price-sensitive (price coefficient of -6.727 versus -5.233), more displaysensitive (display coefficient of 1.454 versus 1.113), and more feature-sensitive (feature
coefficient of 0.320 versus 0.228), than segment 1.
As far as the estimated inertia coefficients are concerned, they are positive for both
segments. This implies that after controlling for the effects of a household’s intrinsic brand
preferences and their responsiveness to the marketing activities of brands, the household’s
probability of buying the previously purchased brand is higher than the household’s probability
of buying any of the remaining brands. In order to understand the degree of asymmetry across
brands in terms of how much they benefit from the presence of inertia in the category, we
calculate the following difference (averaged over all observations in the data), Pr(j|j) – Pr(j|i),
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which represents the increase in a household’s purchase probability for brand j on account of
inertia, for each brand j, where the conditioning event refers to the previously purchased brand,
and Pr(j|i) is averaged over all possible i. This turns out to be 0.044, 0.064, 0.028 and 0.014 for
Coke, Pepsi, Royal Crown and the Private Label, respectively. In other words, a household’s
purchase probability for Coke (Pepsi) increases by 0.044 (0.064) when Coke (Pepsi) is the
previously purchased brand than when a competing brand is the previously purchased brand.
Taken in the context of the four brands’ average market shares in the data, which represent
brands’ average baseline purchase probabilities among all households in the market, the benefits
due to inertia translate to percentage increases of 15 %, 14 %, 20 % and 16 %, respectively.
Considering each segment separately, the increase in purchase probabilities on account of inertia
for Coke, Pepsi, Royal Crown and the Private Label, respectively, turn out to be 0.133, 0.191,
0.085 and 0.027 for segment 1, and 0.008, 0.013, 0.004 and 0.008 for segment 2. In other words,
households in segment 1 are more inertial than households in segment 2. The estimated inertia
parameters translate to switching costs -- which can be interpreted as the price premium that a
brand can charge in the current week to a consumer who bought that same brand last time,
relative to a consumer who bought another brand last time – of $0.30 and $0.13 in segments 1
and 2, respectively. These are substantively significant, given the average prices of cola brands
(see Table 1.1).
Table 1.3 presents the estimates of a benchmark demand model, again under the 2support heterogeneity specification, without inertia. The two segments have been ordered to
correspond, in terms of their estimated sizes, to the two segments in Table 1.2. First, we notice
that the demand model without inertia does not fit the demand data as well as the demand model
with inertia (BIC of 29090.12 versus 27624.15), which shows that the estimated degree of inertia
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is statistically important. Further, the estimated brand intercepts for all four brands are found to
be higher than their counterparts in Table 1.2. This implies that ignoring inertia makes one
falsely estimate a higher probability of cola category purchase (relative to the outside good
option) for a household. Similar substantive biases manifest in the estimated marketing mix
coefficients as well. For example, the magnitude of the estimated price coefficient is overstated
in the smaller segment 1 (-6.223 versus -5.233), and understated in the larger segment 2 (-6.544
versus -6.727), when inertia is ignored. The magnitude of the estimated display coefficient is
understated in both segments when inertia is ignored. To the extent that the estimated marketing
mix sensitivities are critical inputs to the cola brands’ marketing mix optimization problems,
mis-estimated marketing mix sensitivities yielded by a demand model without inertia will imply
different (sub-optimal) profit margins for the cola manufacturers than those yielded by a demand
model with inertia. These differences are elaborated upon in the next section.

1.5.2 Estimation Results for the Structural Econometric Model of Dynamic
Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of Inertial Demand
Table 1.4 presents the estimated marginal costs of production, along with the estimated
variances of the cost shocks, for Coke and Pepsi under the proposed structural econometric
model of dynamic manufacturer pricing.12 As a point of comparison, we also present the
estimated costs yielded by a myopic pricing model, which sets the discount factor for all agents –
cola manufacturers, as well as the retailer -- to 0. In other words, the myopic pricing model
assumes that prices are set to maximize current period profit, as in, for example, Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). As a second point of comparison, we present the estimated costs

12

Again ignoring the strategic aspect of the prices of Royal Crown and the Private Label can be rationalized by the
observation in Table 1.1 that they have much smaller market shares than Coke and Pepsi and are, therefore, unlikely
to significantly influence the pricing decisions of Coke and Pepsi.
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yielded by a static pricing model, referred to as Static1, which, in addition to assuming that
prices are set to maximize current period profit (as under the myopic pricing model), sets the
inertia parameter to zero. In other words, under the myopic pricing model, manufacturers do not
have the investing incentive when making their pricing decisions, while under the static pricing
model Static 1, they have neither investing nor harvesting incentives. As a third point of
comparison, we present the estimated costs yielded by a second static pricing model, referred to
as Static 2, which is identical to Static 1, except that it takes the estimated demand model without
inertia as an input to the pricing model. In other words, instead of setting the inertia parameter to
zero under the estimated demand model with inertia (as does Static 1), Static 2 uses the estimates
from the demand model without inertia. Comparing Static 2 to the remaining three pricing
models allows us to investigate the influence of demand mis-specification on the estimated
marginal costs.
We find that the estimated marginal costs for Coke and Pepsi decrease under the myopic
pricing model compared to the proposed dynamic pricing model. Specifically, the estimated
marginal cost for Coke (Pepsi) is $0.650 ($0.593) under the dynamic pricing model and $0.605
($0.531) under the myopic pricing model. This translates to a price-cost margin of $0.155
($0.157) for Coke (Pepsi) under the dynamic pricing model and $0.200 ($0.219) under the
myopic pricing model. This can be understood as follows: The myopic pricing model allows for
the harvesting (pressure to raise price), but not the investing (pressure to decrease price),
incentive in driving the firm’s pricing decision. Therefore, the optimal price-cost margin that is
implied by the myopic pricing model is higher than that implied by a dynamic pricing model.
Since both models are estimated using the same observed price data, a higher implied price-cost
margin under the myopic pricing model manifests as a lower estimated marginal cost. This
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makes intuitive sense. From a substantive standpoint, the differences in the estimated marginal
costs are 5c and 6c, for Coke and Pepsi, respectively. In percentage terms, the differences in the
estimated profit margins translate to 29 % and 40 %, respectively. In other words, by ignoring
the investing incentive of dynamic manufacturer pricing, we over-estimate retail profit margins
of Coke and Pepsi by 29 % and 40 %, respectively.
We find that the estimated marginal costs for Coke and Pepsi are lower under the static
pricing model, Static1, than under the proposed dynamic pricing model, but higher than under
the myopic pricing model. Specifically, the estimated marginal cost for Coke (Pepsi) is $0.621
($0.563) under Static 1, which translates to a price-cost margin of $0.184 ($0.187). This can be
understood as follows: When compared to the myopic pricing model, Static 1 does not allow for
the harvesting (pressure to raise price) incentive in driving the firm’s pricing decision. Therefore,
the optimal price-cost margin that is implied by the static pricing model is lower than that
implied by a myopic pricing model. Since both models are estimated using the same observed
price data, a lower implied price-cost margin under the static pricing model manifests as a higher
estimated marginal cost than under the myopic pricing model. This makes intuitive sense. From a
substantive standpoint, the differences in the estimated marginal costs between the dynamic
pricing model and the static pricing model, Static1, are 3c for both brands. In percentage terms,
the differences in the estimated profit margins translate to 19 % for both brands. In other words,
by ignoring both the harvesting and investing incentives of dynamic manufacturer pricing, we
over-estimate retail profit margins of Coke and Pepsi by 19 % each
To summarize the results above, ignoring only the investing incentive, but not the
harvesting incentive, over-estimates profit margins of Coke and Pepsi by 29 % and 40%,
respectively; on the other hand, ignoring both the harvesting and investing incentives over39

estimates the profit margins of both brands by only 19%. The reason for this finding is as
follows: The direction of the bias in the estimated marginal cost of a brand that results from
ignoring the investing incentive is negative (i.e., toward zero); the direction of the bias from
ignoring the harvesting incentive is positive (i.e., away from zero); therefore, the net effect of the
two opposing biases that result from simultaneously ignoring both investing and harvesting
incentives, is to yield estimated profit margins of brands that are closer to the profit margins that
are yielded by the dynamic pricing model.
Last, we find that the estimated marginal costs for Coke and Pepsi are lower under the
static pricing model, Static2, than under the proposed dynamic pricing model, but higher than
under the myopic pricing model and the static pricing model, Static1. Specifically, the estimated
marginal cost for Coke (Pepsi) is $0.635 ($0.569) under Static 2, which translates to a price-cost
margin of $0.170 ($0.181). The difference in the estimated marginal costs between the two static
pricing models, Static1 and Static2, is purely attributable to mis-specification biases in the
estimated demand parameters that are used as inputs in the pricing model. While both Static1 and
Static2 set the inertia parameter to zero, Static 1 relies on Table 1.2, while Static 2 relies on
Table 1.3, for estimates of the remaining demand parameters. A comparison of Tables 1.2 and
1.3 makes clear that the estimates of the remaining demand parameters (i.e., brand intercepts and
marketing mix coefficients) are significantly different between Static 1 and Static 2. This
explains why the estimated costs are different between Static1 and Static2.
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1.6 Managerial Implications
In order to understand the substantive implications of our estimated structural
econometric model of dynamic pricing, we use the estimated structural parameters for the
proposed dynamic pricing model (from the second column of Table 1.4) and compute the
equilibrium prices for Coke and Pepsi that would result from myopic pricing (which ignores the
investing incentive), as well as from static pricing (which ignores both the investing and
harvesting incentives). The results of these computations are reported in Table 1.5. Under static
pricing, the equilibrium profit margins of Coke and Pepsi are $0.183 (28%) and $0.184 (31%),
respectively. Under myopic pricing, the equilibrium profit margins of Coke and Pepsi are $0.198
(31%) and $0.209 (35%), respectively. Under dynamic pricing, the equilibrium profit margins of
Coke and Pepsi are $0.153 (24%) and $0.165 (28%), respectively. This means that profit margins
increase by 1.5c (2.3%) and 2.5c (4.2%) when harvesting incentives are introduced, and decrease
by 4.5c (6.9%) and 4.3c (7.3%) when investing incentives are additionally introduced, the net
effect being that the profit margins are lower than those in the absence of inertia. In other words,
the investing incentive dominates the harvesting incentive for the two cola brands, thus yielding
equilibrium prices for the both brands that are lower than those in the absence of inertia. These
results validate the analytical implications of the normative pricing models of Chintagunta and
Rao (1996), Villas-Boas (2004), Dube, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) and Doganoglu (2010).
Next, we compute the amount of foregone profit to each manufacturer that results from
not undertaking dynamic pricing and, instead, wrongly employing myopic pricing for its brand,
while the competing manufacturer correctly undertakes dynamic pricing for its brand. We find
that Coke’s (Pepsi’s) profit increases by 7.6 % (4.8 %), while Pepsi’s (Coke’s) profit decreases
by 4.7 % (5 %), when Pepsi (Coke) wrongly chooses myopic pricing for its brand. This shows
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that substantively meaningful losses in profits accrue to cola brands from not employing
dynamically optimal pricing strategies for their brands.
In order to further understand the substantive implications of our estimated structural
model of dynamic pricing, we perform a series of counterfactual simulations. Given the
estimated structural parameters from our proposed dynamic pricing model, and given a specific
simulation scenario, we compute the optimal prices, under different states, S and ν, for the
manufacturers. For this purpose, we use the NFXP algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (1994).
Computational details are provided in Appendix 2.

1.6.1 Counterfactual Simulation 1: Effects of Discount Factors
We compute the steady-state prices, steady-state demands, as well as steady-state singleperiod profits, for Coke and Pepsi, at various values of discount factors (assumed to be common
across the two firms). The purpose of this simulation is to investigate the impact of
manufacturers’ forward-looking behavior on price competition among brands and, therefore, the
resulting impact on their steady-state profits. Lowering the discount factor, and thus assuming
that manufacturers are less forward looking, decreases manufacturers’ investing incentives, while
keeping their harvesting incentives unchanged. This should increase the equilibrium prices of
both brands. However, the losses associated with decreased demand, which are partly a function
of decreased customer lock-in for the long run, of such increases in equilibrium prices, may more
than offset the gains associated with increased prices and, therefore, lead to a net decrease in
steady-state profits of the manufacturers. Figure 1.1 presents the steady-state single-period
profits of both brands as functions of the discount factors. We observe the following:
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As the discount factor increases from 0 to 0.69, both Coke’s and Pepsi’s profits
steadily increase, with the percentage increase in profits being larger for Pepsi
(0.62 %) than for Coke (0.24 %).



As the discount factor increases from 0.69 to 0.86, Coke’s profits steadily
decrease (by 0.26 %), while Pepsi’s profits continue to steadily increase (by 0.21
%).



As the discount factor increases from 0.86 to 0.99, both brands’ profits steadily
decrease (by 1.03 % and 1.47 % for Coke and Pepsi, respectively).

In other words, both sufficiently low discount factors (< 0.69) and sufficiently high discount
factors (> 0.86) yield lower profits than intermediate values of discount rates for Coke and Pepsi.
In terms of cola category profits, we find that they steadily increase up to a discount rate of 0.81,
beyond which they start decreasing.
In order to better elucidate the profit findings in Figure 1.1, we plot the steady-state
prices of both brands as functions of discount rates in Figure 1.2. As discussed above, we find
that prices of both brands steadily decrease, at an increasing rate, as the discount rate increases.
Specifically, Pepsi’s equilibrium price decreases from $0.80 to $0.76 (5 %), while Coke’s
decreases from $0.85 to $0.80 (5.9 %), as the discount rate increases from 0 to 0.99. The
corresponding demands13 are found to steadily increase in a convex manner. Figure 1.2 make it
clear that the investing incentive, which steadily increases as the discount rate increases,
decreases the equilibrium prices of both brands from their myopic levels (corresponding to a
discount rate of 0). Interestingly, however, the net effect to each firm of a decreasing profit
margin and increasing demand, both of which result from a decreasing price, at steady state
13

The steady-state demands are available from the authors upon request.
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yields the non-monotonic curve shown in Figure 1.1. Since previous empirical studies have only
focused only on a comparison of a dynamic pricing model (which corresponds to a discount
factor close to 1) to a myopic pricing model (which discounts to a discount factor of 0), there is
no existing empirical wisdom on the impact of different discount factors on firms’ profits. Ours
is the first study to contribute in this regard.

1.6.2 Counterfactual Simulation 2: Effects of Discount Factor Combinations
We compute the steady-state prices, steady-state demands, as well as steady-state singleperiod profits, for Coke and Pepsi, at various combinations of values of discount factors (from 0
to 0.99) between Coke and Pepsi. In other words, we allow Coke and Pepsi to have different
discount factors (unlike counterfactual simulation 1, which assumes that both manufacturers
have identical discount factors). Figure 1.3 presents the steady-state profits of both brands, as
well as the cola category as a whole, as functions of various discount factor combinations. We
observe the following:


Each brand’s profit is increasing in its own discount factor and decreasing in the
competing brand’s discount factor.



Using the highest discount factor (0.99) is a dominant strategy for each firm in the
sense of yielding the highest profit regardless of what discount factor its
competitor uses.



Cola category profits are maximized when Pepsi’s discount factor is 1 and Coke’s
discount factor is 0.

This counterfactual simulation suggests that near-maximal foresight (i.e., discount factor of
0.99), which is what we assume about manufacturer rationality in our structural model of
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dynamic pricing, is a dominant strategy for both Coke and Pepsi in the sense of yielding the
highest profit to each manufacturer regardless of what discount factor its competitor uses.

1.6.3 Counterfactual Simulation 3: Effects of Increasing Inertia
We have discussed that investing incentives to pricing dominate harvesting incentives in
our data. However, the relative importance of one incentive compared to the other, in general,
would depend on the degree of inertia in demand. In this counterfactual simulation, we study
how the relative importance of each incentive varies as the degree of inertia in the market varies
from low to high. One way of increasing consumer inertia toward cola brands may be to increase
reminder advertising in the category using media such as billboards and television (for example,
by using catchy jingles, such as “The Real Thing” for Coke, and the “Pepsi Generation” for
Pepsi), which increase “top of mind” recall among the installed bases of each brand toward their
favored brands and, therefore, make them repeat purchase the favored brands with greater
likelihood.14 We compute the steady-state prices, steady-state demands, as well as steady-state
single-period profits, for Coke and Pepsi, at various values of the inertia parameter for one
segment at a time. Figures 1.4 and 1.5 present the steady-state profits of both brands as functions
of the inertia parameter for segments 1 and 2, respectively. We observe that the profits of both
brands increase as inertia of either segment increases. Specifically, as the inertia parameter of
segment 1 (2) increases from 0 to 3.5, the profits of Coke and Pepsi increase by 292 % (88 %)
and 341 % (151 %), respectively. As the inertia parameter of segment 1 (2) increases from its
existing value of 1.6 (0.9) to 3.5, the profits of Coke and Pepsi increase by 147 % (218 %) and
140 % (227 %), respectively. These are sizeable increases in profits for both brands.

14

Seetharaman (2004) shows that in-store display advertising, as well as newspaper feature advertising, serve this
role by increasing consumer inertia toward brands in the long run.
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In order to better elucidate the profit findings in Figures 1.4 and 1.5, we plot the steadystate prices of both brands as functions of the inertia parameter for segments 1 and 2,
respectively, in Figures 1.6 and 1.7. We find in both figures that as inertia increases, the price of
each brand steadily decreases -- first at an increasing rate, then linearly, and eventually at a
decreasing rate – until it reaches a minimum and then starts increasing. Specifically, in Figure
1.6 (1.7), Coke’s price decreases from $0.83 ($0.81) to $0.80 ($0.78), i.e., 3.6 % (3.7 %), as the
inertia parameter of segment 1 (2) increases from 0 to 2 (3.5), and then starts increasing. In the
same figure, Pepsi’s price decreases from $0.76 ($0.76) to $0.75 ($0.74), i.e., 1.3 % (2.6 %), as
the inertia parameter of segment 1 (2) increases from 0 to 1 (3), and then starts increasing. This
implies that the investing incentive dominates the harvesting incentive at low and moderate
levels of inertia, while the harvesting incentive dominates the investing incentive at high levels
of inertia.
The steady-state demands for both brands that correspond to the brand prices reflected in
Figure 1.6 and 1.7 are found to steadily increase as the inertia parameter of the respective
segment increases. In order to see how the steady-state demand within each segment behaves, we
separately plot the steady-state demand from each segment in Figures 1.8 and 1.9. Interestingly,
in Figure 1.8 (1.9), we observe monotonically increasing demand from segment 1 (2), but a nonmonotonicity in demand – increasing with inertia, reaching a maximum, and decreasing
thereafter – from segment 2 (1). The non-monotonicity for segment 2 (1) happens at the value of
inertia that corresponds to the non-monotonicity in price that is observed in Figure 1.6 (1.7) for
the same segment. In other words, since the inertia parameter for segment 2 (1) is fixed in Figure
1.8 (1.9), increasing the price of a brand decreases demand for the brand, which is not surprising.
However, the increase in inertia for segment 1 (2) in Figure 1.8 (1.9) overwhelms the increase in
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price of a brand, when it happens, and sustains the increase in demand for the brand from that
segment over the entire range of inertia tested in this simulation.
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1.7 Conclusions
In this study, we propose and estimate, for the first time in the literature, a structural
dynamic pricing model in the presence of inertial demand. For this purpose, we study the cola
market, which is characterized by significant inertia in consumers’ brand choices over time. We
estimate a consumer-level brand choice model, which includes the effects of inertia, using
scanner panel data on cola brand choices of consumers in a local market over a period of two
years. We then estimate a manufacturer-level oligopolistic pricing model using retail tracking
data on store-level prices of cola brands from the same local market over the same period of two
years. Using a two-segment brand choice model, we find that the cola category is characterized
by significant inertia in demand, with estimated brand-level switching costs of $0.30 and $0.13
for the two consumer segments. Not accounting for such inertia in brand choices leads to
seriously mis-estimated sensitivities of cola demand to marketing mix variables.
We find that ignoring the investing incentives in manufacturers’ dynamic pricing, as
represented in our dynamic pricing model, leads to a spurious overestimation in the estimated
profit margins of 29 % and 40 % for Coke and Pepsi, respectively. Ignoring both the investing
and harvesting incentives leads to a spurious overestimation in the estimated profit margins of 19
% for both brands. Estimating a mis-specified demand model without inertia and using it as an
input for a static pricing model leads to estimated profit margins that are slightly lower than
those implied by the static pricing model that simply sets the inertia parameter to zero among the
estimated parameters yielded by a demand model with inertia.
The net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives in our data is that the
equilibrium prices of both brands are lower (by 4.6 % and 3.1 % of costs, for Coke and Pepsi,
respectively) than those in the absence of inertia. In other words, the harvesting incentive -48

which increases equilibrium prices of Coke and Pepsi by 2.3 % and 4.2 %, respectively -- is
dominated by the investing incentive -- which decreases equilibrium prices of Coke and Pepsi by
6.9 % and 7.3 %, respectively -- for cola brands. We find that each brand’s profits would
decrease by about 5 % if it were to engage in myopic pricing while its competitor engages in
dynamic pricing.
A counterfactual simulation reveals that increasing the discount factor from 0 to 1
initially increases, and eventually decreases, the profits of the two brands. Another
counterfactual simulation reveals that each brand’s profits increase in its own discount factor and
decrease in its competitor’s discount factor. A third counterfactual simulation reveals that the
investing incentive to pricing dominates at low to moderate levels of inertia, while the harvesting
incentive dominates at high levels of inertia. However, profits of both brands steadily increase
with inertia.
Some caveats are in order. First, we treat prices an exogenous in our demand model, i.e.,
we do not allow for unobserved demand shocks. We acknowledge that our estimates of marginal
costs may, therefore, be over-estimated if such unobserved demand shocks exist (see Che, Sudhir
and Seetharaman 2007 for a discussion of this issue). Second, our model does not capture an
additional source of dynamics in demand, i.e., due to consumer stockpiling behavior, which has
implications for dynamic pricing. In the cola category, however, stockpiling is not pervasive as
revealed in our data. Households typically buy their preferred quantity of cola on f purchase
occasions. Therefore, ignoring the effects of consumer stockpiling may not be a critical omission
in our case. That said, while extending our model to product categories where consumer
stockpiling is, in fact, significant, explicitly modeling stockpiling behavior, as well as its
implications for dynamic pricing, would be necessary. Third, we ignore the strategic role of the
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retailer in the analysis. We treat the retailer as a passive intermediary in the distribution channel.
We do this mainly for computational convenience since introducing the dynamic pricing
incentives of the retailer would lead to non-trivial modeling extensions. However, we still obtain
interesting substantive implications from comparing dynamic, myopic, and static pricing
incentives of manufacturers using our framework. Extending our model to additionally
incorporate the strategic role of the retailer is an important area for future research.
We believe that there are some additional research extensions that would be interesting to
pursue. First, investigating the demand conditions under which periodic price promotions of
competing brands emerge as a natural by-product of the competitive dynamic equilibrium in the
presence of inertia would be interesting (see, for example, Freimer and Horsky (2008), for an
interesting analytical model of price promotions in the presence of inertia). Second, extending
the analysis to the case of variety seeking (the opposite of inertia) would be useful to understand
the dynamic pricing implications of variety seeking markets (see, for example, Seetharaman and
Che (2009)). Last, but not least, understanding how to increase inertia in a market to favor one
brand over another would be useful not only in its own research right, but also from the
standpoint of informing brand managers on how to better leverage inertial demand for more
pricing power in the market.
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1.8 Technical Appendices
1.8.1 Appendix 1: Forward Simulation:
The objective of this simulation exercise is to calculate the continuation values
EV j ( s ), j  1, 2,..., J in the Bellman equations of each manufacturer for a given cost structure (

c j ,  j ), and policy function parameters (  j ) in the numerical search routine. We simulate

numerous paths. For each simulated path, we first choose ( s0 , 0 ) from the state space. We then
run the following simulation routine:
1. Given ( s0 , 0 ) and the assumed parametric policy function calculate p0 ( s0 , 0 ) . Then,
calculate demand D0 ( s0 , p0 )
2. Given p0 ( s0 , 0 ) , and D0 (s0 , p0 ) , calculate  0 j  ( p0 j  c j  j ) D0 j . Then calculate the
installed customer base in the next period s1 ( s0 , p0 ) .
3. Given s1, draw 1 . Given (s1 , 1 ) , repeat steps 1 and 2.
4. Repeat step 3 for T times until  T  0 .
Taking discounted sum of profits calculated for each of the T periods, and averaging over all
simulation paths gives us the set of approximated values for each manufacturer V j ( s0 , 0 ) . We
then regress these values on ( s0 , 0 ) to get an approximated value function for any arbitrary
state variables.
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1.8.2 Appendix 2: Multi-Agent NFXP Algorithms for the Counterfactual Studies:
The objective of this routine is to find the dynamic pricing equilibrium of the manufacturer
pricing game numerically. Here is the algorithm:
1. Start with p10 , p2 0
1.1. Given p2 0 , get p11 by running the subroutine 2.2.
1.2. Given p11 , get p21 by running the subroutine 3.4
1.3. Repeat 1.1-1.2 until p n  p n 1  0 .
1.4. Set p*  p n
Appendix 2.1: Subroutine Coke’s Optimality
The objective of this subroutine is to find the best response of Coke p1* to a given set of actions
of Pepsi p2 , under a given continuation value in Coke’s Bellman equation EV1 ( s) . In other
words, the objective is given by

p1  arg max ( p1  c1  1 ) D1   E 'V1 ( s ' | s, p)
where D1 is the demand for Coke. In order to find optimal p1*
1. Start with p10 . Given p10 calculate the following:
EV1 ( s, 1 )
 D1  ( p1  c1  1 ) D11   EV11 ( s ')
p1

where D11  D1 / p1 , and EV11  (EV1 ( s ') / s ')(s '/ p1 )
By rearranging, we can get p11 as follows:

p11  c1  1   D1   EV11 ( s ') D111
2. Given p11 , repeat step 1, to get p12
3. Repeat step 2 to update p1 until an iteration n such that p1n  p1n 1  0
4. Set p1*  p1n
Appendix 2.2: Subroutine Coke’s Dynamic Response
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The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Coke to the set of actions
of Pepsi: p2 . Here is how it goes:
1. Start with EV10 ( s )  0 : the continuation value is in Coke’s Bellman equation is zero.
a. Get p10* under EV10 ( s )  0 by using the subroutine 2.1. Given p10* , p2 calculate
the following Bellman equation:
V11 ( s , )  ( p10*  c1   1 ) D1   E 'V1 ( s ' | s, p10* , p2 )

b. Given V11 ( s, ) , calculate EV11 ( s ) by averaging over  . Given EV11 ( s ) get p11* by
using the subroutine 2.1. Calculate the Bellman equation in (a) under p11* , p2 .
Calculate the updated continuation value EV12 ( s ) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that p1n*  p1n 1*  0
d. Set p1*  p1n*
Appendix 2.3: Subroutine Pepsi’s Optimality
The objective of this subroutine is to find the best response of Pepsi p2* to a given set of actions
of Coke p1 , under a given continuation value in Pepsi’s Bellman equation EV2 ( s) . In other
words, the objective is given by

p2  arg max ( p2  c2  2 ) D2   E 'V2 ( s ' | s, p)
where D2 is the demand for Pepsi. In order to find optimal p2*
1. Start with p2 0 . Given p2 0 calculate the following:
V2 ( s, )
 D2  ( p2  c2  2 ) D22   EV22 ( s ')
p 2

where D22  D2 / p2 , and EV22  (EV2 ( s ') / s ')(s '/ p2 )
By rearranging, we can get p21 as follows:

p21  c2  2   D2   EV22 ( s ')  D22 1
2. Given p21 , repeat step 1, to get p2 2
3. Repeat step 2 to update p2 until an iteration n such that p2 n  p2 n 1  0
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4. Set p2*  p2 n
Appendix 2.4: Subroutine Pepsi’s Dynamic Response
The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Pepsi to the set of actions
of Coke: p1 . Here is how it goes:
1. Start with EV2 0 ( s )  0 : the continuation value is in Pepsi’s Bellman equation is zero.
a. Get p2 0* under EV2 0 ( s )  0 by using the subroutine 2.3. Given p1 , p2 0*
calculate the following Bellman equation:
V21 ( s, )  ( p2 0*  c2   2 ) D2   E 'V2 ( s ' | s , p1 , p2 0* )

b. Given V21 ( s , ) , calculate V21 ( s ) by averaging V21 ( s , ) over  . Given
V21 ( s , ) get p21* by using the subroutine 2.3. Calculate the Bellman equation

in (a) under p1 , p21* . Calculate the updated continuation value EV2 2 ( s ) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that p2 n*  p2 n 1*  0
d. Set p2*  p2 n*
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1.8.3 Appendix 3: Stockpiling Behavior of Consumers
I checked 1) the correlation between the quantities purchased and prices paid 2) the correlation
between the interpurchase times and prices paid. I found that there is no strong correlation for
either scenario.
i)

Correlation between Quantity (Qt) and Price (Pt)

Cor(Qth/Qh,Pt)=-0.078, where
Qth=quantity purchased by household h at time t
Qh=median quantity for household h over time t
ii)

Cor (

Correlation between Interpurchase time (IPt) and Price (Pt)
IPth   IPh Pth   Ph
,
)  0.0006

 IP

h

P

h

These two statistics show that we have very low reason to believe that the stockpiling behavior
is significant in the data.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics on Cola Dataset (June 1991-June 1993)15
Number of Households = 356
Number of Shopping Trips = 32942
Number of Purchases = 5784
Brand
Coke
Pepsi
Royal Crown
Private Label

15

Price ($ / unit)
$0.8050 ($0.0680)
$0.7500 ($0.0574)
$0.8051 ($0.0747)
$0.5311 ($0.0740)

Display
0.1458 (0.0953)
0.2236 (0.1818)
0.0943 (0.0788)
0.1044 (0.0780)

Standard Deviations are reported within parentheses.
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Feature
0.2535 (0.1249)
0.3314 (0.2088)
0.1067 (0.0883)
0.0641 (0.0849)

Market Share
0.3027 (0.1038)
0.4567 (0.1173)
0.1721 (0.0906)
0.0685 (0.0572)

Table 1.2: Estimation Results – Inertial Demand Model (2-Support Heterogeneity)16

LL = -13716.32, BIC = 27624.15
Segment 1

 Coke
 Pepsi

Segment 2

0.950 (0.183)

-0.019 (0.177)

1.028 (0.181)

0.136 (0.181)

 PL
 RoyalCrown

-2.144 (0.194)

-1.677 (0.138)

0.516 (0.167)

-0.481 (0.166)

 Price
 Display

-5.233 (0.232)

-6.727 (0.239)

1.113 (0.078)

1.454 (0.071)

 Feature
SD

0.228 (0.078)

0.320 (0.078)

1.560 (0.050)
29 %

0.858 (0.048)
71 %

Size

Table 1.3: Estimation Results –Demand Model without Inertia (2-Support Heterogeneity)17
LL = -14460.57, BIC = 29090.12
Segment 1

Segment 2

 Coke

2.386 (0.164)

0.072 (0.192)

 Pepsi

2.608 (0.160)

0.259 (0.194)

-1.826 (0.171)

-1.469 (0.144)

1.577 (0.152)

-0.427 (0.179)

-6.223 (0.215)

-6.544 (0.258)

 Display

1.086 (0.070)

1.449 (0.079)

 Feature

0.195 (0.072)

0.345 (0.082)

35 %

65 %

 PL
 RoyalCrown

 Price

Size

16

Standard errors are reported within parentheses in Tables 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5. The standard errors in Table 1.4 are
bootstrapped standard errors.
17
Standard errors are reported within parentheses in Tables 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5. The standard errors in Table 1.4 are
bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 1.4: Estimation Results – Manufacturer Pricing Model

Dynamic

Myopic

Static1

Static2

CCoke

$0.650 ($0.019)

$0.605 ($0.017)

$0.621 ($0.013)

$0.635 ($0.012)

CPepsi

$0.593 ($0.020)

$0.531 ($0.019)

$0.563 ($0.013)

$0.569 ($0.014)

 Coke

$0.068 ($0.015)

$0.072 ($0.007)

$0.068 ($0.007)

$0.071 ($0.007)

 Pepsi

$0.060 ($0.013)

$0.064 ($0.006)

$0.059 ($0.005)

$0.064 ($0.005)

Table 1.5: Equilibrium Prices and Profits

Dynamic

Myopic

Static

PCoke

$0.803 (0.019)

$0.848 (0.020) $0.833 (0.020)

PPepsi

$0.758 (0.020)

$0.802 (0.024) $0.777 (0.023)

Margin Coke

$0.153 (0.007)

$0.198 (0.012) $0.183 (0.008)

Margin Pepsi

$0.165 (0.008)

$0.209 (0.015) $0.184 (0.009)
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Figure 1.1: Steady-State Profits as a Function of Discount Factor
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Figure 1.2: Steady-State Prices as a Function of Discount Factor
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Figure 1.3: Steady-State Profits versus Discount Factor Combinations
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Figure 1.4: Steady-State Profits as a Function of Segment 1 Inertia
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Figure 1.5: Steady-State Profits as a Function of Segment 2 Inertia
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Figure 1.6: Steady-State Prices as a Function of Segment 1 Inertia
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Figure 1.7: Steady-State Prices as a Function of Segment 2 Inertia
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Figure 1.8: Steady-State Demands as a Function of Segment 1 Inertia
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Figure 1.9: Steady-State Demands as a Function Segment 2 Inertia
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2 Implications of Inertial Demand for Prices in the

Distribution Channel: A Structural Econometric Approach
2.1 Introduction
Consumer product manufacturers, such as Coke and Pepsi, typically sell their brands
through common, independent retailers, such as Kroger. Recent research in the structural
econometric tradition has dealt with the empirical estimation, using real-world scanner data, of
the nature of strategic price interactions in distribution channels, both horizontally among
manufacturers, as well as vertically between manufacturers and the common retailer through
which they sell (see, for example, Kadiyali, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (2000), Sudhir (2001),
Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005), Villas-Boas (2007), Che, Sudhir and Seetharaman (2007),
Draganska, Klapper and Villas-Boas (2010) etc.).18 Such structural econometric models of
pricing in the distribution channel are of great normative value to product manufacturers and
retailers from the standpoint of evaluating and setting optimal pricing policies for their brands
(Bronnenberg, Rossi and Vilcassim (2005)).
It is well documented in the marketing literature that consumer product markets are
commonly characterized by inertia in consumers’ brand choices over time (see, for example,
Seetharaman (2004)).19 Inertia refers to the phenomenon of consumers often repeat-purchasing
the same brand of cola on successive purchase occasions. Such inertial, or habitual, brand choice
behavior of consumers, in turn, leads to the aggregate (e.g., market-level) demand for a brand
being positively correlated over time. In other words, if demand for a brand is high (low) on a
18

The reader is referred to Villas-Boas and Zhao (2005) for an insightful discussion on why it is necessary to jointly
consider the strategic behavior of both manufacturers and the retailer while econometrically analyzing retail prices.
19

Economists usually refer to inertia using the term switching costs.
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given week, it is likely to remain high (low) in ensuing weeks on account of consumer inertia. A
pricing implication of such inertia in demand, for example, is that reducing the retail price of
Coke in the current week will increase the demand for Coke not only in the current week but also
in the subsequent weeks when the price reduction on Coke has been retracted (as long as all
other competing cola brands’ retail prices remain unchanged).
The presence of inertial demand implies that the retailer, while choosing Coke’s retail
price in a given week, would face a trade-off between charging a low price on Coke to attract
customers and locking them in to Coke, versus charging a high price to extract higher profits
from Coke’s already locked-in customers. The retailer faces a similar trade-off while choosing
Pepsi’s retail price in a given week. In sum, therefore, the retailer faces an interesting trade-off in
pricing the cola brand portfolio, for example, in terms of deciding whether to price both Coke
and Pepsi low, versus pricing only Coke (Pepsi) low, versus pricing neither brand low, in a given
week. In order to correctly resolve this trade-off when setting retail prices for cola brands, taking
the manufacturers’ wholesale prices as given, the retailer must know the extent of inertia in
consumers’ brand choices in the cola market, and whether the pricing implications of such inertia
are similar or not among the various brands.
Coca Cola Co. (PepsiCo) must also account for the downstream retailer’s abovementioned pricing strategy, as well as its competitor PepsiCo’s (Coca Cola Co.’s) pricing
strategy, both of which, in turn, depend on the degree of inertial demand enjoyed by the cola
brands among consumers, while choosing wholesale prices for their Coke (Pepsi) brand. For
example, suppose Coca Cola Co. knows that the retailer has an incentive to price Coke high in
the current period, in order to harvest the existing demand of past consumers of Coke. In that
case, the manufacturer could then charge higher wholesale prices for Coke to the retailer than
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otherwise. Conversely, suppose the brand manufacturer knows that the retailer has an incentive
to price Coke low in the current period, in order to invest in increasing the future demand for the
Coke. In this case, the manufacturer must then charge appropriately lower wholesale prices for
Coke to the retailer than otherwise in order to induce the retailer to offer adequately lower retail
prices to the market.
To summarize, therefore, econometrically analyzing the pricing implications of inertial
demand in the context of a distribution channel involves a careful accounting and resolution of
the incentives of competing manufacturers in setting wholesale prices, as well as the incentives
of the common retailer through whom they sell in determining retail prices, for the different
brands in the category. The primary research contribution of our paper rests in our proposal
and estimation of a structural econometric model of dynamic pricing decisions of manufacturers
and a common retailer in the presence of inertia in consumers’ brand choices. Such a model will
be of obvious value to both brand managers and store managers, given the glut of consumer-level
data and analytical tools that are fast permeating the retailing sphere, in guiding strategic pricing
efforts for their brands.
We estimate a consumer-level brand choice model, which includes the effects of inertia,
using scanner panel data on cola brand choices of consumers in a local market over a period of
two years. We then estimate a structural econometric pricing model, that accounts for the pricing
interactions, both among manufacturers, as well as between each manufacturer and the retailer,
using retail tracking data on store-level prices of cola brands from the same local market over
the same period of two years. Using a two-segment brand choice model, we find that the cola
category is characterized by significant inertia in demand, with estimated brand-level switching
costs of $0.30 and $0.13 for the two consumer segments.
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The net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives for cola manufacturers in our
data is that the equilibrium wholesale prices of both brands are lower (by 11.9 % and 7.1 % of
costs, for Coke and Pepsi, respectively) than those in the absence of inertia. In other words, the
harvesting incentive -- which increases equilibrium wholesale prices of Coke and Pepsi by 5.2 %
and 11.3 %, respectively -- is dominated by the investing incentive -- which decreases
equilibrium wholesale prices of Coke and Pepsi by 17.1 % and 18.4 %, respectively -- for cola
brands. For the retailer, however, while the harvesting incentive increases the retailer’s profit
margin by 1.9c and 2.5c, the investing incentive has no impact on retail profit margin. In other
words, while the retailer exploits the benefit of the harvesting incentive, by appropriately
increasing his retail profit margin, almost equally with the manufacturers, the cost of investing is
borne entirely by the manufacturers. In other words, the retailer effectively free rides on the
manufacturers’ efforts by taking a lion’s share of the additional profits that accrue to the channel
from the existence of inertial demand. In terms of the net effect of the harvesting and investing
incentives on distribution channel profits, we uncover a 3c lowered channel profit margin for
Coke, but no change in the channel profit margin for Pepsi.
Using the estimates of our structural econometric model, we study the impact of inertial
demand on the estimated profitability of the retailer and each manufacturer using two
counterfactual simulations. In the first counterfactual simulation, we study the impact of
increasing inertia on each channel member’s profits and investigate which player in the
distribution channel – manufacturer or retailer -- is in a better position to leverage the benefits of
inertial demand in terms of gaining disproportionately more from, say, increasing levels of
inertia in the market. We find that all channel members gain from increasing levels of inertia,
with the retailer gaining disproportionately more than the manufacturers. The investing incentive
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becomes more important for manufacturers as the level of inertia in either consumer segment
increases, thus leading to lower wholesale profit margins. However, as far as the retailer is
concerned, an interesting asymmetry emerges. As the level of inertia in the less inertial segment
increases, the investing incentive becomes more important to the retailer, thus leading to lower
retail profit margins, although at a slower rate than for the manufacturers. However, as the level
of inertia in the more inertial segment increases, the retailer not only does not bear the costs of
the investing incentive (while the manufacturers do), but also ends up free-riding on the
manufacturers’ efforts by steadily increasing his retail profit margins on both brands. This
simulation suggests that the retailer is in a more leveraged position of strength when it comes to
exploiting the increase in inertial demand for cola brands in either consumer segment.
In the second counterfactual simulation, we study the benefits of behavioral price
discrimination, using price-off coupons that are customized across behavioral segments of
consumers, for the retailer and the manufacturers. We find that the retailer can improve retail
profit by 4 % by dropping customized coupons to customers belonging to the more pricesensitive / less inertial segment. Interestingly, we find that the retailer can improve retail profit
by an additional 7 % by selling its customer database to both cola manufacturers and letting them
drop customized coupons for their brands to customers belonging to segment 2, as opposed to
dropping the customized coupons itself. In other words, facilitating manufacturer couponing is a
more profitable strategy to the retailer than undertaking store couponing itself. Interestingly, this
leads to both manufacturers being slightly worse off, in terms of reduced wholesale profits, when
compared to the case of no price discrimination. In other words, the retailer not only entirely
benefits at the expense of manufacturers, but also induces the manufacturers to invest the
necessary effort to generate the additional channel profits.
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2.2 Literature Review
There are two seminal game-theoretic studies, namely Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and
Wernerfelt (1991), that centrally motivate the importance of our econometric research from the
standpoint of pricing strategies of brand manufacturers. We discuss these two studies first, and
later studies on the same issue next.
Beggs and Klemperer (1992) derive the normative pricing implications of inertial
demand in a differentiated duopoly using an infinite period game-theoretic framework, where
new customers arrive and a fraction of old consumers leave in each period. Furthermore, in each
period, old (locked-in) customers and new (uncommitted) customers are intermingled and the
two firms cannot discriminate between these groups of customers. The authors study whether the
firms’ temptation to exploit their current customer bases would lead to higher prices (harvesting
incentive), or whether the firms’ desire to attract new customers would lead to lower prices
(investing incentive), than in the case of no inertia. The authors show that under a wide range of
parametric assumptions, both firms – each with an installed base of existing customers – face
demand functions that are relatively price inelastic compared to their counterparts in an
otherwise identical mature market without inertia. This decreased price elasticity reduces the
price rivalry among the firms, leading to higher prices and profits for both firms. The authors
show that inertial demand could lead to vigorous price competition in the early growth stages of
a market, as competing firms aggressively try to build market shares for their brands. When the
modeling framework allows for rational (i.e., “forward-looking”) consumers, the prices of the
two firms are shown to become less competitive because consumers who realize that firms with
higher market shares will charge higher prices in the future are less price elastic than naïve
consumers. The authors find that price rise as (1) firms discount the future more, (2) consumers
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discount the future less, (3) turnover of consumers decreases, and (4) the rate of growth of the
market decreases.
In contrast to the discrete-time, game-theoretic framework adopted by Beggs and
Klemperer (1992), Wernerfelt (1991) adopts a continuous-time, game-theoretic framework to
study price competition between firms in inertial markets. Consistent with the findings in Beggs
and Klemperer (1992), Wernerfelt (1991) also derives higher equilibrium prices for firms, as
well as a positive effect of the extent of firms’ future discounting behavior on equilibrium prices,
in inertial markets. This shows that the equilibrium pricing results are robust to whether the
game-theoretic pricing models are solved in discrete or continuous time.
Unlike Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and Wernerfelt (1991), who show that the
harvesting incentive outweighs the investing incentive for manufacturers under a wide range of
parametric assumptions, Chintagunta and Rao (1996) and Dube, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) find the
opposite to be the case under some parametric assumptions that are based on actual demand
estimates. They show that myopic pricing strategies of firms that fail to recognize the long-run
impact of their current prices lead to prices that are higher than those implied by dynamic pricing
strategies. Doganoglu (2010) obtains the same result when the degree of inertia in demand in his
model is assumed to be sufficiently low. Villas-Boas (2004) also derives the same result for the
case where inertial demand endogenously arises out of consumers learning about how well
different brands fit their preferences, and when the distribution of consumer valuations for each
product is negatively skewed. In a recent study, Cosguner, Chan and Seetharaman (2012) obtain
the same result by actually estimating an econometric model of oligopolistic manufacturer
pricing using retail price data.
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All of the models of dynamic pricing discussed above ignore the strategic role of the
retailer in the distribution channel. In other words, the pricing implications of inertial demand are
derived for manufacturer pricing, tacitly assuming that manufacturers sell directly to end
consumers. Two recent studies look at the consequences of inertial demand for retailers’ pricing
decisions, namely, Che, Sudhir and Seetharaman (2007) and Dube, Hitsch, Rossi and Vitorino
(2009). However, Dube et al. (2009) derive optimal retailer prices, ignoring the role of
manufacturers and, therefore, treating the retailer’s costs as exogenously specified. Che et al.
(2007), on the other hand, simultaneously account for the strategic role of competing
manufacturers in setting wholesale prices, while deriving optimal retail prices in the distribution
channel. Furthermore, Che et al. (2009) take an econometric, as opposed to a purely gametheoretic, approach in explaining retail pricing decisions of retailers. In this sense, the Che et al.
(2007) study is closely related to this research. However, given the computational challenges
associated with the estimation of a structural econometric model of pricing in the distribution
channel (as will be explained in the next paragraph), Che et al. (2007) formulate their pricing
model for a finite number of decision periods only (as opposed to infinite periods). Our study
relaxes this restrictive assumption and derives the appropriate pricing model for the distribution
channel under the general case of infinite period decision-making of manufacturers (as in the
game-theoretic literature, see, for example, Beggs and Klemperer (1992) and Wernerfelt (1991)),
as well as the retailer. In doing this, we are able to understand the tension between the harvesting
and investing incentives of manufacturers and the retailer in driving the observed retail prices of
brands in our data. More generally, our approach can be used by manufacturers and retailers in
order to correctly assess the long-run consequences of alternative pricing strategies of brands,
something that cannot be satisfactorily accomplished using the Che et al. (2007) approach.20
20

Che et al. (2007) represent a pioneering effort in the estimation of dynamic pricing decisions of manufacturers and
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Estimable econometric models of dynamic pricing in the distribution channel in the
presence of inertial demand require both (1) the solution of discrete-time, stochastic dynamic
optimization problems for each manufacturer and retailer, where the manufacturer (retailer)
chooses from a continuum of possible wholesale (retail) prices, and (2) the fixed point to the
game-theoretic problem of multiple firms (manufacturers and retailer) employing their best
pricing responses to each other’s pricing choices, to be accommodated in the estimation. Such
models, referred to as structural models of dynamic pricing in the distribution channel in the
presence of inertial demand, therefore, present significant computational challenges. An
additional estimation challenge arises when some firm actions (such as wholesale prices, as in
our case) are unobserved by the researcher. In fact, as we will discuss in detail later, this
difficulty renders recently developed econometric techniques in the econometrics literature –
Pakes and McGuire (2001), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) etc. – inapplicable to our context.
We propose a fully dynamic pricing model for the distribution channel, as well as a new
estimation method to recover its parameters when some of the agents’ actions are unobserved.
We apply our structural econometric model of dynamic pricing in the distribution channel to the
cola market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our structural
econometric model of inertial demand, as well as the associated estimation procedure. In the
third section, we present our structural econometric model of dynamic pricing in the distribution
channel in the presence of inertial demand, as well as the associated estimation procedure.
Section 4 presents the estimation results from applying our proposed structural econometric
models of inertial demand and dynamic distribution channel pricing on scanner panel data from
the retailer in the presence of inertial demand. Our effort represents a logical next step given the computational
advances of recent years.
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the cola market. In Section 5, we discuss the managerial implications of our estimation results
based on some counterfactual simulations, one of which pertains to behavioral price
discrimination. Section 6 concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
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2.3 Structural Econometric Model of Inertial Demand
To develop a structural econometric model of brand choice with the no-purchase option
for scanner panel data in the cola category, we recognize that the typical household h (h = 1, 2,
…, H), which is observed over t = 1, 2, …, Th shopping trips, either buys or does not buy one of
J cola brands. On any given shopping trip, we observe an outcome variable yht that takes the
value j (j = 0, 1, 2, …, J). When yht = 0 it means that the household does not purchase in the cola
category during shopping trip t. Further, during each shopping trip of a household, we observe
the price (Phjt), display (Dhjt), and feature (Fhjt) covariates that the household faces, regardless of
whether the household purchases in the cola category. Our econometric approach models the
multinomial outcome yht as explained next.
Let Uhjt denote the (indirect) utility of household h for brand j at shopping trip t. We
assume that we can express this utility as a function of the entire set of brand-specific covariates,
(Phjt, Dhjt, Fhjt), as well as the household’s lagged brand choice outcome, which represents the
brand that was most recently purchased by the household, also referred to as the household’s
state variable, sht, as follows.
U hjt   hj  1h * Phjt   2 h * Dhjt   3 h * Fhjt  h * I [ S ht  j ]   hjt ,

(1)

where αhj, j = 1, 2, …, J, are the household’s brand intercepts, βh = (β1h, β2h, β3h) are the
household’s marketing mix sensitivities, I[A] is the indicator function that takes the value of 1
when event A occurs and the value of 0 otherwise, Sht represents the household’s previously
purchased brand in the category, and λh is the household-specific inertia parameter.21 We assume

21

This coefficient is more generally referred to as the state dependence coefficient, and captures inertia only when it
takes positive values; it captures variety seeking when it takes negative values. In this paper, we will refer to the
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that the random errors εht = (εh1t, εh2t, …, εhJt) are distributed iid Gumbel with location 0 and scale
1.
Let Uh0t denote the (indirect) utility of household h for the no-purchase option (also
called “outside good”) 0 at shopping trip t. We assume that we can express this utility as follows.

U h 0t   h 0t .

(2)

We assume that the random error εh0t is distributed iid Gumbel with location 0 and scale 1.
We determine the multinomial outcome yht in the usual way: by the principle of
maximum utility. We observe the outcome yht = j when the utility of the jth option to the
household exceeds that of the remaining options. This yields the following probabilistic model
for brand choice.

Phjt 

 hj  1h *Phjt   2 h *Dhjt  3 h *Fhjt  h *I [ Sht  j ]

e

J

1   e hk  1h *Phkt  2 h *Dhkt  3 h *Fhkt  h *I [ Sht  k ]

,

(3)

k 1

which has the familiar Multinomial Logit (MNL) functional form. This inertial demand model,
which has been used, for example, by Seetharaman, Ainslie and Chintagunta (1999), captures
inertia as a first-order behavioral phenomenon, i.e., only the household’s most (and not the
second-most, third-most etc.) recent brand choice influences its current brand choice
probabilities. This assumption is reasonable given that past research in packaged goods
categories has demonstrated that higher-order lagged brand choices capture little additional
explanatory variance beyond the most recent lagged choice outcome, in terms of explaining

state dependence coefficient as the inertia parameter for expositional convenience since it only takes positive values
in our cola dataset.

77

current brand choices of consumers (see, for example, Kahn, Kalwani and Morrison 1986,
Seetharaman 2003 etc.).
The objective of the empirical analysis is to estimate the parameters  = ({αhj, j = 1, 2,
…, J}, {βh = (β1h, β2h, β3h)}, λh) for each of H households.
Following the latent class approach of Kamakura and Russell (1989), we assume that
households belong to M segments. This simplifies our empirical objective to estimating the
parameters  for each of M segments (rather than H households), as well as the associated
segment sizes. This is done by maximizing the following sample log-likelihood function (which
has a convenient closed-form expression).22

M
 Th J
Yhjt  
ln L   ln    m *   Pmjt   ,
 m 1

h 1
 t 1 j 1


H

where

m

(4)

 [0, 1] stands for the size of segment m, and Pmjt is the conditional MNL probability

(obtained by replacing subscript h with subscript m in equation (4)) of household h buying brand
j at shopping trip t, given that household h belongs to segment m. Since households usually
undertake shopping trips at weekly intervals, we will interchangeably use t, for expositional
purposes, to refer to shopping trip or week.

22

Unlike the random coefficients logit model, the latent class logit model yields convenient closed-form expressions
for aggregate-level brand demand functions (as will be explained in the next section). Further, Andrews, Ainslie and
Currim (2002) show that the latent class logit model yields aggregate estimates of brand demand, as well as holdout
demand forecasts, that are just as accurate as those yielded by random coefficients logit models.
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2.4 Structural Econometric Model of Dynamic Distribution Channel

Pricing in the Presence of Inertial Demand
To develop a structural econometric model of distribution channel pricing in the cola
category, we recognize that each manufacturer j (j = Coke, Pepsi) sets a wholesale price for a
retailer, while the retailer then sets a retail price, for their brand, during each of t = 1, 2, …, T
weeks in the data.23 The retailer is a monopolist in a local market. During each week, we observe
an outcome variable Pjt > 0 for each brand. Our econometric approach models the continuous
outcome Pjt as explained next. We do this in two steps. We first derive a predictive model of
aggregate-level brand demand, which is an aggregation of individual-level brand demand, as
derived in the previous section. We then embed this predictive model of aggregate-level brand
demand within a dynamic pricing game within a distribution channel involving competing
manufacturers and a common retailer. This dynamic pricing game assumes that manufacturers
engage in Bertrand price competition with each other while setting their wholesale prices, while
the retailer plays the role of a Stackelberg follower while setting retail prices for the
manufacturers’ brands (taking their wholesale prices as given).

2.4.1 Predictive Model of Aggregate-Level Brand Demand
Let Sjtm denote a state variable that represents the (segment-specific) installed base for
brand j during week t. This installed base variable represents the number of consumers in
segment m, as of week t, whose most recent brand choice in the cola category is brand j. Further,
let S tm  ( S1mt , S 2mt ,..., S Jtm ) represent the vector of installed base variables across all J brands during

23

While there are 4 brands – Coke, Pepsi, Royal Crown, and Private Label – in the cola category, we endogenize the
prices of only the two major brands – Coke, Pepsi – in the empirical analysis. This is done for computational
convenience. The prices of Royal Crown and Private Label are treated as exogenous to the analysis.

79

week t. The following equation, called the state equation, captures the evolution of the state
variable, Sjtm, from week t to week t+1.
J
J


S mj ,t 1   S ktm * Prtm ( k  j )  S mjt *  1   Prtm ( j  k ) ,
k j
 k j


(5)

where Prtm ( k  j ) stands for the switching probability, for a consumer in segment m, of
switching from brand k to brand j, during week t, and is given by
 mj  1 m *Phjt   2 m *Dhjt  3 m *Fhjt

e

Pr (k  j ) 
m
t

 mk  1 m *Phkt   2 m *Dhkt  3 h * Fhkt  

1 e

J

 e

 ml  1 m *Phlt   2 m *Dhlt  3 h * Fhlt

.

(6)

l k

Equation (5) represents how the installed base of brand j changes from week t to week t+1. This
happens in two ways (as represented by the two terms on the right-hand side of the equation):
one, customers currently in the installed bases of the other brands ( S kt m ) switch to the installed
base of brand j by buying brand j in week t, which happens with probability Prtm ( k  j ) , as
shown in equation (6); two, customers currently in the installed base of brand j ( S jt m ) continue
being in the installed base of brand j, by either repeat-purchasing brand j, or choosing the nopurchase option, in week t, with the collective probability of the two events being
1   k  j Prtm ( j  k ) ).
J

Given the state equation (5) governing the evolution of the state variable, S jt m ,
aggregate-level brand demand for brand j in week t, Djt, is given by
M

D jt    m * D mjt ,

(7)

m 1
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where Djtm stands for segment-level demand for brand j in week t in segment m, and is given by
J

D mjt   Sktm * Prtm (k  j ).

(8)

k 1

This completes our discussion of the predictive model of aggregate brand-level demand. In
summary, aggregate brand-level demand for brand j in week t is predicted using equation (7),
which, in turn requires equation (8) as an input, which, in turn, requires equations (5) and (6) as
inputs. The unknown parameters in these equations – which include all parameters in equation
(6), as well as the parameter

m

in equation (7) -- are estimated using household-level scanner

panel data, as explained in the previous section.

2.4.2 Markov-Perfect Equilibrium of the Dynamic Pricing Game
Let Cjt denote the marginal cost of the manufacturer for brand j during week t. It is
written as
C jt  C j   jt ,

(9)

where Cj stands for a time-invariant marginal cost component (such as average production cost),
and νjt is a time-varying cost shock (due to time-varying supply shocks, changes in raw material
prices etc.) that is known to the manufacturers (but not to the researcher). We assume that νjt is
iid N (0, j2) across all j and t. Let νt = (ν1t, ν2t, …, νJt)’.
We assume a discrete-time, infinite-horizon framework (with t = 1, 2, …, ), with
manufacturers making simultaneous wholesale pricing decisions in each period (week), and
playing a repeated Bertrand game with discounting. Given wholesale price Wjt and retail prices
Pt = (P1t, P2t,…, PJt)’, the manufacturer’s single-period profit in period t is given by
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 j (Wt , Pt , St , t )  (W jt  C j  jt )* D j ( Pt , St ).

(10)

We assume that the retailer’s marginal cost of selling each unit of brand j in period t is equal to
the wholesale price of the brand, Wjt.24 We assume that the retailer chooses retail prices in each
period, taking wholesale prices as given. The retailer’s single-period profit in period t is given by
J

 R (Wt , Pt , St , jt )   ( Pkt  Wkt ) * Dk ( St , Pt ).
k 1

(11)

During week t, each manufacturer is assumed to choose the wholesale price for their
brand, Wjt, with the objective of maximizing the discounted present value of their brand profit,
while the retailer is assumed to choose the retail prices of all brands, Pjt, with the objective of
maximizing the discounted present value of category profit, over an infinite horizon. On account
of inertial demand, these current prices, Wjt and Pjt, will not only influence the current demands
of brands, Djt, but also change the installed bases of all brands in all consumer segments, S jt m ,
which, in turn will affect the future stream of profits of, as well as future strategic interactions
among, the manufacturers and the retailer. All channel members are assumed to have full
information about the current installed bases of all brands in all consumer segments,
St 

 S

1t

m



,..., S Jt m  ; m  1,..., M '  S , as well as the current cost shocks associated with all

brands,  t  Z , before making their pricing decisions. The observed (by the researcher) state
vector, St, evolves according to the state equation (5) given earlier. In this set-up, the cost shocks
of manufacturers,  t , do not affect the observed states, St, directly. Instead, the cost shocks,  t ,
have transitory effects on manufacturers’ payoffs, as well as the retailer’s payoff, by affecting

24

This is a standard assumption in the literature. Other components of marginal costs, such as inventory holding
costs, can be considered as relatively minor when compared to the wholesale prices.
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their pricing decisions. In other words, as in Rust (1987), we assume that the observed states, St,
and unobserved states,  t , are conditionally independent.
Conditional on the current states, St and  t , the retailer is assumed to maximize the
expected discounted sum of single-period category profits,



E   k t *  R ( Pk ,Wk , Sk , k ) | St , t  ,
 k t


(12)

while the manufacturer is assumed to maximize the expected discounted sum of single-period
brand profits.



E   k t *  j ( Pk ,Wk , Sk , k ) | St , t  ,
 k t


(13)

where the expectation is taken over all the other channel members’ current actions, all future
values of observed and unobserved states, and all future actions of all channel members. We also
assume that the manufacturers and the retailer have a common discount factor   1 .
We focus our attention on Pure-Strategy Markov-Perfect Equilibria (MPE), noting that
there could be multiple such equilibria. In our case, a Markov strategy for a channel member
describes their pricing strategy for week t – wholesale or retail, depending on whether
manufacturer or retailer -- as a function of current states, St and  t . Formally, the retailer’s
strategy can be written as  R : S x Z  P   J , where P = (P1, P2…, PJ)’ is the vector of retail
prices, while each manufacturer’s strategy can be written as  j : S x Z  W j   , where Wj is
J 1

the wholesale price charged by manufacturer j. A Markov profile     j , which is defined
j 1

as  : S x Z  (P,W) , is an MPE if there is no channel member i (retailer or manufacturer) who
83

prefers an alternative strategy  i ' over  i , when all other channel members are choosing their
strategies according to  i . This can be formally written as follows.

Vi ( S , |  i ,  i )  Vi ( S , |  i ',  i ), i, S ,  i ',

(14)

Given that the behavior is a Markov profile, for each manufacturer j, the discounted sum
of profits can be written in the form of the following Bellman equation.





V j ( S , )  supW j (W j  C j  j ) * D j ( S , P )   *  V j ( S ' | S , P ) dF ( ') ,

(15)

Similarly, the retailer’s discounted sum of profits can be written as the form of the following
Bellman equation.

VR ( S , )  sup P1 , P2 ,..., PJ

J

 ( Pk  Wk )* Dk ( S , P)   *  VR ( S ' | S , P)dF ( ')  . (16)
 k 1


It is useful to note that the payoff relevant states for the retailer are (S, ), which are identical to
those for each manufacturer. While the retailer’s pricing decisions are directly influenced only by
manufacturers’ wholesale prices, since the manufacturers’ wholesale prices are functions of S
and  , the value function of the retailer is a function of (S, ).

2.4.3 Estimation Challenges
The objective of the estimation is to estimate the parameters ({Cj,

j}

j = 1, 2, …, J}).

The biggest challenge for the researcher is that wholesale prices are unobserved, but as
manufacturers’ wholesale pricing policies will determine the retailer’s retail pricing policy, if the
retailer’s continuation value in equation (16) is known, under the Stackelberg assumption, one
can invert unobserved wholesale prices by using the retailer’s optimality conditions for setting
retail prices. Similarly, if each manufacturer’s continuation value in equation (15) is known,
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under the Bertrand assumption, one can invert unobserved manufacturer costs by using the
manufacturer’s optimality conditions for setting wholesale prices. Thereafter, putting the
retailer’s and manufacturers’ value functions together, and by jointly exploiting the optimality
conditions of the retailer and the manufacturer (which gets rid of the unobserved wholesale
prices since they cancel out), one can infer the marginal costs of the manufacturers using
observed retail prices. This estimation strategy is adopted in Sudhir (2001). Such a strategy is
facilitated by the authors’ assumptions that there are no unobserved structural cost shocks for
manufacturers, and that the channel members maximize their profits over a finite number (i.e.,
three) of periods. Neither assumption holds in our case. We allow for structural cost shocks,  ,
as well as assume that manufacturers and the retailer maximize infinite-period expected profits.
This results in the value functions of the retailer and the manufacturers not having a closed form
in our case, which makes the estimation strategy of Sudhir (2001) inapplicable.
Since the continuation values in equations (15) and (16) are not known, one needs to
compute the continuation values of the dynamic game for each candidate cost structure. There
are two estimation methods that have been previously developed for multi-agent problems, such
as ours, and have become well-established in the literature. These are the nested fixed point
algorithm of Pakes and McGuire (1994) and the two-step algorithm of Bajari, Benkard and Levin
(2007). We briefly discuss these two methods next, and then explain why they are not suitable
for our needs, before proceeding to describe our proposed estimation method.
First, let us start with the nested fixed point algorithm (NFXP, Rust 1987), which
represents the classical approach to estimating dynamic decision problems. This algorithm relies
on the idea that optimal prices can be obtained by finding the fixed point of the value function (a
functional equation) in the Bellman equation, i.e., by locating a function such that the right-hand
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and left-hand sides of the Bellman equation become equal. The Pakes and McGuire (1994)
algorithm, which uses the nested fixed point algorithm in a multi-agent context, allows us to
accurately calculate optimal dynamic policies without having to use the data, conditional on
given parameters. However, the major limitation of this algorithm is its computational burden,
which we explain next.
In order to estimate the set of structural parameters that rationalizes the observed pricing
outcomes in our data, we would need to search for the fixed points which represent the optimal
policies for different combinations of state variables in a numerical search routine, and repeat the
procedure until we get a close match between the computed and observed prices. That is,
conditional on model parameters, we must compute the MPE for all channel members. The
algorithm requires us to iterate over j many times until the best response function is satisfied. In
our case, the fixed point search must account for both horizontal (among manufacturers) as well
as vertical (between manufacturers and the retailer) interactions among agents, which increases
the computational burden. Even more strikingly, with large dimensions of the state space, such
as in our case (with two manufacturers and a retailer, as well as two consumer segments), the
curse of dimensionality problem becomes severe. Additionally, there is no recommended way of
choosing an equilibrium in the case of multiple equilibria, which often arise in multi-agent
problems.25 Furthermore, the convergence of the equilibrium strategy, , is also not guaranteed
under the Pakes and McGuire (1994) algorithm since it is not a contraction mapping. For this
reason, adapting the NFXP algorithm to estimate our dynamic game presents a non-trivial
challenge.
25

In the existing empirical literature on dynamic games, it is argued that the GMM estimation method solves the
multiple equilibria problem because the data can be used to tell which equilibrium is actually chosen by the players.
However, since wholesale prices are unobserved in our case, which of several wholesale price equilibria applies
cannot be determined using the data.
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The computational burden associated with the NFXP algorithm can be mitigated using
the two-step approach of Hotz and Miller (1993), which has been suitably extended for multiagent problems by Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007). Under this approach, the policy functions
of agents are estimated for various points in the state space using the observed data. With the
estimated policy functions and state transitions, one can calculate the values of the agents, for a
given set of structural parameters, using the idea of forward simulation, which was first proposed
by Hotz, Miller, Sanders and Smith (1994). However, this approach is inapplicable in our case
since wholesale prices of manufacturers are unobserved in the data which makes it impossible to
estimate the wholesale price policy functions of the manufacturers.
To summarize, there exists no estimation approach in the literature that can be suitably
modified to handle the estimation of our proposed dynamic pricing model for the distribution
channel. In this paper, therefore, we develop a new estimation method that can handle both the
existence of unobserved actions of agents (i.e., manufacturers’ wholesale prices, in our case), as
well as a high-dimensional state space (with two manufacturers and a retailer, as well as two
consumer segments). We describe our estimation method next.

2.4.4 Proposed Estimation Method for the Dynamic Pricing Game
Under the MPE assumption, optimal actions of the manufacturers are functions of payoff
relevant states. We approximate the policies of manufacturers and the retailer using a parametric
polynomial function of observed and unobserved states. With the parameterized policy functions,
we can forward simulate the value functions. Our estimation strategy is to search for the
parameters of policy functions and structural parameters through one numerical search routine,
by minimizing a criterion function based on moment conditions, together with a penalty function
if the optimality conditions are not satisfied. At true structural parameters, it is required that our
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parametric policy functions are consistent with the policies from the data, and the parametric
policy functions satisfy the first-order conditions.
The objective of the estimation is to estimate the parameters ({Cj,

j}

j = 1, 2, …, J}).

We parameterize the retailer’s retail pricing policies for brands as flexible functions of state
variables, S and ν, as shown below.
Pj  Pˆ j ( S , |  jR ) ,

(17)

where Pˆj () denotes the parametric approximation of the optimal retail policies of the retailer,
and  jR

is a vector of parameters characterizing this flexible function. We also parameterize

manufacturers’ wholesale pricing policies as flexible functions of state variables, S and ν, as
shown below.
W j  Wˆ j ( S , |  jM ) ,

(18)

where Wˆ j () denotes the parametric approximation of the optimal wholesale pricing policies of
manufacturer j, and  jM is a vector of parameters characterizing this flexible function.
Given the policy functions in equations (17) and (18), as well as the structural parameters
(which yield the transition probabilities for state variables S and ), the expected continuation
values,

E 'V j ( S ')   V j ( S ' | S , P )dF ( ')

and

E 'VR ( S ')   VR ( S ' | S , P)dF ( ') , which are

represented by the second terms on the right-hand side of equations (15) and (16) respectively,
can be computed using forward simulation (see Appendix 1 for details).
We take the derivative of the value function of the retailer in equation (16) with respect to
retail price Pj in order to construct the first-order conditions for the retailer, as shown below.
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J
D
E V ( S ')
VR ( S , )
Fj 
 D j   ( Pk  Wk )* k   *  ' R
 0.
Pj
Pj
Pj
k 1

(19)

This first-order condition of the retailer is different from that which corresponds to myopic profit
maximization on account of the last term, i.e.,  *

E 'VR ( S ')
. This term captures the influence
Pj

of the current retail price, Pj, on the next period’s state, S’, and, therefore, on the expected
continuation value, E 'VR ( S ') , of the next period. In the absence of this term, the only effect of

Dk

J

inertia in demand will be reflected in the second term,

 ( P  W )* P
k 1

k

k

. The derivative, with

j

respect to retail price, of the expected continuation value of the next period,

E 'VR ( S ')
, can be
Pj

obtained using chain rule, as shown below.
E 'VR ( S ') E 'VR ( S ') S '( S , P)

*
.
Pj
S '
Pj

(20)

Rearranging terms, we can write the first-order condition for retail price such that it expresses the
retailer’s optimal retail price for a brand as a function of S and , as shown below.
1

D
E V ( S ')   D j 

Pj ( S , )  W j   D j   ( Pk  Wk ) * k   *  ' R
 .
* 
Pj
Pj
k j

  Pj 
*

(21)

If the retail pricing policy function in equation (17) is optimal, for any given set of state
variables, (S,  ), the computed retail prices should match the retail prices from the above
equation, after allowing for approximation error due to the parametric policy functions, as shown
below.
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Pj * ( S , )  Pˆj ( S , |  jR )

(22)

We take the derivative of the value function of the manufacturer in equation (15) with
respect to wholesale price Wj in order to construct the first-order conditions for the manufacturer,
as shown below.

V j (S , )
W j

J E V ( S ')
P
 J D j Pk 
' j
*
* k  0.
 D j  (W j  C j  j )* 
   *
Pk
W j
k 1
 k 1 Pk W j 

(23)

This first-order condition of the manufacturer is different from that which corresponds to myopic
J

E 'V j ( S ')

k 1

Pk

profit maximization on account of the last term, i.e.,  * 

*

Pk
. This term captures
W j

the influence of the current wholesale price, Wj, on the next period’s state, S’, and, therefore, on
the expected continuation value, E 'V j ( S ') , of the next period. In the absence of this term, the
only

effect

of

inertia

in

demand

will

be

reflected

in

the

second

term,

 J D j Pk 
(W j  C j  j )* 
*
 . The derivative, with respect to retail price, of the expected
 k 1 Pk W j 
continuation value of the next period,

E 'V j ( S ')
Pk

, can be obtained using chain rule, as shown

below.

E 'V j ( S ')
Pk



E 'V j ( S ') S '( S , P)
*
.
S '
Pk

(24)

Rearranging terms, we can write the first-order condition for wholesale price such that it
expresses the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price for a brand as a function of S and , as
shown below.
90

1

J E V ( S ')

P   J D P 
W j * ( S , )  C j   j   D j   *   j
* k   j * k  .
Pk
W j   k 1 Pk W j 
k 1


(25)

The above equation involves the retailer’s retail pricing responses to manufacturers’ wholesale
price changes, i.e., P / W . We take the derivative of the retailer’s first-order condition, Fj (see
equation 19), with respect to all of the J retail prices (dP1,…, dPJ) and with respect to a single
wholesale price Wj, with variation dWj. The following equation system can be derived.
Fj1dP1 / dW1  Fj 2 dP2 / dW1    FjJ dPJ / dW1  D1 / Pj
Fj1dP1 / dW2  F j 2 dP2 / dW2    FjJ dPJ / dW2  D2 / Pj


,

(26)

Fj1dP1 / dWJ  Fj 2 dP2 / dWJ    FjJ dPJ / dWJ  DJ / Pj

where Fij   2VR ( S , ) / Pi Pj .
We can represent the above JxJ total derivatives in matrix form as follows
dP
 F 1 A ,
dW

(27)

where the [j, i] th elements of the above matrices are as shown below.
Pj
D
dP
[ j, i] 
, F [ j , i ]  Fji , A[ j , i ]   i for i, j  1, 2,..., J .
dW
Wi
Pj

(28)

Substituting from equations (27) and (28) in to equation (25), we obtain the manufacturer’s
optimal wholesale pricing policy function. If the wholesale pricing policy function in equation
(18) is optimal, for any given set of state variables, (S,  ), the computed wholesale prices should
match the wholesale prices from equation (25), after allowing for approximation error due to the
parametric policy functions, as shown below.
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W j * ( S , )  Wˆ j ( S , |  jM ).

(29)

In order to recover the structural parameters of interest i.e., Cj and

j,

we construct the

following two moment conditions.

E[ j | S ]  0, E[ j 2 | S ]   2j  0 ,

(30)

where  j is obtained using the optimality conditions of the retailer and the manufacturers, i.e.,
equations (21) and (25), as shown below.
D
E V ( S ')   D j 

 j  Pj  C j   D j   ( Pk  Wk ) * k   *  ' R

* 
Pj
Pj
k j

  Pj 
1

J E V ( S ')

P   J D j Pk 
 j
 Dj   * 
* k  * 
 .
Pk
W j   k 1 Pk W j 
k 1


1

(31)

The GMM estimator, as applied in the literature, typically relies on the first moment. In our case,
in order to identify the cost shock variance parameter, j, we additionally use the second
moment, as shown in equation (30). A second point of departure of our estimation approach from
the GMM estimator that is typically used in the literature lies in equations (22) and (29). Given a
set of state variables, ( S q ,q ) , q = 1, …, S, our estimates are obtained by minimizing not only a
criterion function that is based on the moment conditions in equation (31), but also the following
two “penalty” functions.
S

[P
q 1

*

j

S

 [W
q 1

 ( S , |  R )]2 ,
( S q , q )  P
j
q
q
j

*
j

( S q , q )  Wˆ j ( S q , q |  jM )]2 ,
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(32)

At the true policy functions and true values of model parameters, the errors associated with the
moment conditions in equation (31), as well as the approximation errors in equation (32), will be
minimized.
Our estimation approach is similar to the recently proposed estimation method in
Cosguner, Chan and Seetharaman (2012), except for the additional second penalty function in
equation (32), which is based on the difference between the polynomial approximation of the
wholesale price and the optimal wholesale price that is implied by the first-order condition. This
renders the estimation computationally much more manageable when compared to the NFXP
method.
The asymptotic distribution of our estimator is difficult to derive and even if it has a
closed form, it is likely to be difficult to calculate (as in BBL). Furthermore, we have to account
for the estimation error in the estimated demand function. Therefore, we use the following
bootstrapping procedure to calculate the standard errors:
1. We draw θDs, s = 1, 2, …, ns, from the asymptotic normal distribution of the demand
ˆ D stands for the estimated demand
ˆ D , ˆ D ) , where 
model parameter estimates, N (

parameters, and ˆ D stands for the estimated covariance matrix of the estimated
demand parameters (which accounts for the estimation error in the demand function).
2. We obtain bootstrapped data, (Pts, Sts, s = 1, 2, …, ns), by drawing independent,
random samples, with replacement, from the original data.
3. We re-estimate the parameters of the structural econometric model of dynamic
channel pricing for each bootstrapped draw of the original data (from Step 2 above),
while generating the evolution of states, S, as well as the demand function, D, based
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on each bootstrapped draw of the estimated demand model parameters (from Step 1
above).
4. Using the estimated pricing model parameters from Step 3 above, across all
bootstrapped draws, we calculate the standard errors associated with those estimates.
Below, we summarize the benefits of our proposed estimation method for multi-agent
dynamic decision problems.
1. It allows the researcher to invert actions that are unobserved in the data, as is typically
done in static decision problems, by inverting them from the optimality conditions;
2. It allows the researcher to model situations with multiple unobserved states entering
the policies of economic agents;
3. It allows the researcher to calculate optimal dynamic policies without relying on large
amount of data;
4. It uses the forward simulation idea to yield significant computational gains.
Since our methodology relies on first-order conditions from the Bellman equation, it is
designed specifically for problems with continuous policies such as pricing, advertising, R&D
investment etc. For problems involving both continuous and discrete (e.g., entry and exit)
policies, one can use a hybrid algorithm that uses inequality constraints for discrete actions,
together with the first order conditions for continuous actions. To further decrease the
computational burden, the numerical search routine should start with a good set of initial values.
For example, one can start with the parameters from the static counterpart of the dynamic game.
Since the parameters from the static game may be fairly close to the dynamic counterpart, it
reduces the convergence time of the numerical search routine significantly. Another issue
concerns how to flexibly model the pricing policy functions. Employing a high-order polynomial
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approximation may lead to too many estimable parameters, especially when the dimensionality
of the state space is large. Therefore, we start with a low-order (e.g., linear) polynomial, and then
gradually increase the order of the polynomial until the optimal and the parametric policy
functions closely match each other.
We conduct a series of Monte Carlo simulations in order to study how well our proposed
estimation approach can recover the model parameters under a wide range of assumed structural
parameters, i.e., high versus low average cost, high versus low cost shock, using a sample size
similar to ours. We also allow for monopoly versus duopoly manufacturer scenarios, as well as
presence versus absence of the retailer, in the simulation. Under each tested case in our
simulations, we find that the estimates of Cj and j and are very close to their true (assumed)
values. The results are reported in Appendix 3. This Monte Carlo simulation exercise gives us
confidence regarding the efficiency of our proposed estimator.
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2.5 Empirical Results
We use scanner panel data from Information Resources Incorporated’s (IRI) scannerpanel database on cola purchases of 356 households making 32942 shopping trips at a
supermarket store in a suburban market of a large U.S. city. The dataset covers a two-year period
from June 1991 to June 1993. The supermarket is a local monopolist in the sense of not having
other supermarkets nearby and, therefore, drawing a loyal core group of shoppers to the same
store for their grocery shopping. Table 1.1 presents some descriptive statistics on weekly
marketing variables and market shares of four major cola brands in the data. The 356 households
are observed to purchase cola during 5784 (17.56%) of their shopping trips. In terms of average
prices, we see that Coke, Pepsi and Royal Crown occupy a high price-tier, while the Private
Label occupies a low price-tier, at the store. In terms of display and feature promotions, we see
that Pepsi is displayed and featured more frequently than the other brands by the retailer. In
terms of average weekly market shares, Pepsi is observed to be the dominant cola brand (with an
average market share of 0.4567), while the Private Label is the smallest brand (with an average
market share of 0.0685).

2.5.1 Estimation Results for the Inertial Demand Model
Table 1.2 presents the estimates of the inertial demand model under the 2-support
heterogeneity specification (which is reported, as well as used as an input for the dynamic
pricing model, for expositional convenience).26 As far as the brand intercepts are concerned, we
find that the private label has the smallest -- most negative -- value of the estimated brand
intercept among the four brands in both segments. This suggests that the private label brand

26

Substantive insights gleaned from our empirical analysis remain similar when the heterogeneity specification is
modified to include additional supports for the heterogeneity distribution. These results are available upon request.
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enjoys the lowest baseline preference in the cola market, which is not surprising considering that
private label brands typically draw sales on account of their lower prices, as opposed to their
relative intrinsic attractiveness, when compared to other (national) brands. Pepsi is found to have
the highest baseline preference among the four brands in both segments, while Coke has the
second highest baseline preference. This is consistent with the institutional reality that Pepsi was
the dominant cola brand in supermarket stores (even though Coke had higher overall national
market share) in the US during the 1990s.
As far as the marketing mix coefficients are concerned, the estimated price coefficient is
negative, as expected, while estimated display and feature coefficients are positive, as expected,
for both segments. Between the two segments, segment 2 (the larger segment, containing 71 %
of the households) is found to be more price-sensitive (price coefficient of -6.727 versus -5.233),
more display-sensitive (display coefficient of 1.454 versus 1.113), and more feature-sensitive
(feature coefficient of 0.320 versus 0.228), than segment 1.
As far as the estimated inertia coefficients are concerned, they are positive for both
segments. This implies that after controlling for the effects of a household’s intrinsic brand
preferences and their responsiveness to the marketing activities of brands, the household’s
probability of buying the previously purchased brand is higher than the household’s probability
of buying any of the remaining brands. The estimated inertia parameters translate to switching
costs -- which can be interpreted as the price premium that a brand can charge in the current
week to a consumer who bought that same brand last time, relative to a consumer who bought
another brand last time – of $0.30 and $0.13 in segments 1 and 2, respectively. These are
substantively significant; given the average prices of cola brands (see Table 1.1).
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2.5.2 Estimation Results for the Structural Econometric Model of Dynamic Pricing
in the Distribution Channel in the Presence of Inertial Demand
Table 2.1 presents the estimated marginal costs of production, along with the estimated
standard deviations of the cost shocks, for Coke and Pepsi under the proposed structural
econometric model of dynamic pricing in the distribution channel. Given the average retail prices
of Coke and Pepsi in Table 1.1, the estimated costs of $0.436 and $0.355 translate to estimated
channel profit margins of $0.369 (85 %) and $0.395 (111 %) for Coke and Pepsi, respectively.
These costs are in the ball-park of published estimates of marginal costs in this industry during
that period (see, for example, Yoffie 1994), and lend face validity to our estimates.
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2.6 Managerial Implications
In order to understand the substantive implications of our estimated structural
econometric model of dynamic pricing, we use the estimated structural parameters for the
proposed dynamic pricing model (from Table 2.1) and compute the resulting equilibrium
wholesale and retail prices for Coke and Pepsi. We compare these prices to those that would
result from myopic pricing (which ignores the investing incentive) by setting the discount factor
for all channel members to 0. Additionally, we compare the prices to those that would result
from static pricing (which ignores both the investing and harvesting incentives) which not only
sets the discount factor for all channel members to 0 (as in myopic pricing) but also sets the
inertia parameter to zero. The results of these computations are reported in Table 2.2. Under
static pricing, the equilibrium profit margins of Coke and Pepsi are $0.1939 (31%) and $0.1909
(35%), respectively, for the retailer, and $0.1839 (42%) and $0.1894 (53%), respectively, for the
manufacturers. Under myopic pricing, the equilibrium profit margins of Coke and Pepsi are
$0.2128 (33%) and $0.2163 (37%), respectively, for the retailer, and $0.2066 (47%) and $0.2293
(65%), respectively, for the manufacturers. Under dynamic pricing, the equilibrium profit
margins of Coke and Pepsi are $0.2139 (38%) and $0.2151 (42%), respectively, for the retailer,
and $0.1322 (30%) and $0.1641 (46%), respectively, for the manufacturers.
The above findings imply that manufacturer profit margins increase by 2.3c (5.2%) and
4c (11.3%) when harvesting incentives are introduced, and decrease by 7.4c (17.1%) and 6.5c
(18.4%) when investing incentives are additionally introduced, the net effect being that
manufacturers’ profit margins are lower than those in the absence of inertia. In other words, the
investing incentive dominates the harvesting incentive for the two cola manufacturers, thus
yielding equilibrium wholesale prices and, therefore, profit margins that are lower than those in
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the absence of inertia. These results validate the analytical implications of the normative pricing
models of Chintagunta and Rao (1996), Villas-Boas (2004), Dube, Hitsch and Rossi (2009) and
Doganoglu (2010), as well as the results of a counterfactual simulation in Cosguner, Chan and
Seetharaman (2012).27
As far as the retailer’s profit margins are concerned, they increase by 1.9c and 2.5c when
harvesting incentives are introduced, and do not change when investing incentives are
additionally introduced, the net effect being that the retailer’s profit margins are higher than
those in the absence of inertia. In other words, the harvesting incentive dominates the investing
incentive for the retailer, thus yielding equilibrium retail profit margins for both brands that are
higher than those in the absence of inertia. In other words, while the retailer exploits the benefit
of the harvesting incentive, by appropriately increasing his retail profit margin, almost equally
with the manufacturers, the cost of the investing incentive is borne entirely by the manufacturers.
In terms of the net effect of the harvesting and investing incentives on distribution channel
profits, we uncover a 3c lowered channel profit margin for Coke, and no change in the channel
profit margin for Pepsi (with its 6c increase from harvesting being annulled by a 6c decrease
from investing).
In order to understand the role of the retailer on manufacturers’ pricing incentives we
performed one more counterfactual simulation, in which we simulated the equilibrium policies of
manufacturers (without the retailer) under dynamic, myopic and static pricing schemes. Table
2.3 shows that both manufacturers invest significantly less and harvest more without the retailer.
The result about the net effect of investing versus harvesting flips for Pepsi (Pepsi starts to

27

None of these mentioned studies allowed for a strategic retailer in the analysis. Our study shows that their
implications hold in the presence of a strategic retailer.
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harvest more than it invests). Therefore, ignoring the retailer creates a significant bias in order to
understand the incentives of manufacturers under inertial demand.
In order to further understand the substantive implications of our estimated structural
model of dynamic pricing, we perform two counterfactual simulations. Under each of these
simulations, given the estimated structural parameters from our proposed dynamic pricing
model, and given the assumed simulation scenario, we compute the optimal prices, under
different states, S and ν, for the manufacturers. For this purpose, we use the NFXP algorithm of
Pakes and McGuire (1994). Computational details are provided in Appendix 2.

2.6.1 Counterfactual Simulation 1: Effects of Increasing Inertia
We have discussed that manufacturers’ investing incentives to wholesale pricing
dominate harvesting incentives in our data, while the retailer faces only a harvesting incentive
and free-rides on the investing costs borne by the manufacturers. However, the relative
importance of one incentive compared to the other to all channel members, in general, would
depend on the degree of inertia in demand. In this counterfactual simulation, we study how the
relative importance of each incentive varies for each manufacturers and the retailer as the degree
of inertia in the market varies from low to high. One way of increasing consumer inertia toward
cola brands may be to increase reminder advertising in the category using media such as
billboards and television (for example, by using catchy jingles, such as “The Real Thing” for
Coke, and the “Pepsi Generation” for Pepsi), which increase “top of mind” recall among the
installed bases of each brand toward their favored brands and, therefore, make them repeat
purchase the favored brands with greater likelihood. We compute the steady-state prices, steadystate demands, as well as steady-state single-period profits, for Coke and Pepsi, at various values
of the inertia parameter for one segment at a time. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present the steady-state
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profits of both manufacturers and the retailer as functions of the inertia parameter for segments 1
and 2, respectively. We observe that the profits of all channel members increase as inertia of
either segment increases. Specifically, as the inertia parameter of segment 1 (2) increases from 0
to 2, the profits of Coke, Pepsi and the retailer increase by 40 % (13 %), 53 % (54 %), and 135 %
(58 %), respectively. As the inertia parameter of segment 1 (2) increases from its existing value
of 1.6 (0.9) to 2, the profits of Coke and Pepsi increase by 4 % (10 %), 3 % (37 %), and 28 % (38
%), respectively. These are sizeable increases in profits for all channel members. The
relationship between profit and inertia appears to be roughly linear for each cola manufacturer,
but convex for the retailer. In other words, the retailer gains disproportionately more from an
increasing level of inertia in the cola market.
In order to better elucidate the profit findings in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, we plot the steadystate wholesale and retail prices of both brands as functions of the inertia parameter for segments
1 and 2, respectively, in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. We find in both figures that as inertia increases, the
wholesale price of each brand steadily decreases. Specifically, in Figure 2.6 (2.7), Coke’s
wholesale price decreases from $0.60 ($0.58) to $0.55 ($0.55), i.e., 9 % (5 %), as the inertia
parameter of segment 1 (2) increases from 0 to 2. In the same figure, Pepsi’s wholesale price
decreases from $0.52 ($0.53) to $0.50 ($0.50), i.e., 3 % (5 %), as the inertia parameter of
segment 1 (2) increases from 0 to 2. This implies that as the level of inertia in either segment
increases, the investing incentive becomes more important for both cola manufacturers.
As far as the retail prices are concerned, in Figure 2.4, Coke’s (Pepsi’s) retail price
decreases from $0.79 ($0.75) to $0.76 ($0.70), i.e., 4 % (7 %) as the inertia parameter of segment
2 increases from 0 to 2. This corresponds to a decrease in retail profit margin of 1.5 % (9 %).
This can be compared to the corresponding decrease in wholesale profit margin for Coke (Pepsi)
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of 20 % (16 %). This implies that as the level of inertia in segment 2 increases, the investing
incentive becomes more important for the retailer, although it is still less than the investing
incentives for the manufacturers. At high levels of inertia, the manufacturers and the retailer both
bear significant costs of investing, although the retailer disproportionately draws, when
compared to the manufacturers, from the additional profits that accrue to the channel (as
evidenced by the profit curves of Figure 2.5).
In Figure 2.3, as the inertia parameter of segment 1 increases from 0 to 2, Coke’s retail
price decreases from $0.79 to $0.78, but Pepsi’s retail price increases from $0.70 to $0.75.
However, since these decreases are shallower than the corresponding decreases in wholesale
prices, the retail profit margins of both Coke and Pepsi increase over that range, by 19 % and 35
%, respectively. In other words, as the level of inertia in segment 1 increases, while the
manufacturers bear increasingly higher costs of investing by lowering their wholesale profit
margins, the retailer not only does not entirely pass through the wholesale price decreases to end
consumers but also enjoys increasing retail profit margins at higher levels of inertia. This is the
ultimate free ride for the retailer at the expense of the cola manufacturers.
The steady-state demands for both brands that correspond to the retail prices reflected in
Figure 2.3 and 2.4 are found to steadily increase as the inertia parameter of the respective
segment increases. In order to see how the steady-state demand within each segment behaves, we
separately plot the steady-state demand from each segment in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. All the
demand curves are monotonically increasing with the level of inertia, except the demand curve
for Pepsi in segment 2 in Figure 2.5, which is monotonically decreasing with the level of inertia
of segment 1. This can be easily understood by the fact that the corresponding retail price curve
for Pepsi in Figure 2.3 is upward sloping. As price increases, demand must decrease. In segment
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1, on the other hand, the adverse impact of increasing retail price of Pepsi is overwhelmed by the
increase in the level of inertia of segment 1, which leads to a net impact of increasing inertia that
is still positive.

2.6.2 Counterfactual Simulation 2: Behavioral Price Discrimination
Since there are two consumer segments in the cola market under study, each with a
different level of inertia and price sensitivity, a question that arises pertains to whether the
channel members can improve their profits from employing behavioral price discrimination
where customized price-off coupons are mailed to consumers belonging to the more pricesensitive segment (in our case, segment 2). A related question that arises pertains to which
channel members must employ such price-off couponing strategies. We conduct a counterfactual
simulation to answer these questions. The results of this simulation are summarized in Table 2.4.
First, we simulate the channel members’ profits under the assumption that the same price
is offered to both consumer segments. The simulated profits under this assumption (called
“Scenario 1”) are reported in the second column of Table 2.4. Second, we simulate the channel
members’ profits under the assumption that the retailer mails customized coupons to customers
belonging to segment 2.28 The simulated profits under this assumption (called “Scenario 2”) are
reported in the third column of Table 2.4. All channel members seem to benefit from the
retailer’s ability to offer different retail prices to the two consumer segments. The profits of
Coke, Pepsi and the retailer improve by 1 %, 7 % and 4 %, respectively (with the channel profit
improving by 4 %). Third, we simulate the channel members’ profits under the assumption that
the manufacturers, as opposed to the retailer, mail customized coupons to customers belonging to

28

The retailer can analyze its customer database, which is constructed by tracking the purchase transactions of its
customers using their loyalty card, to infer which customer belongs to segment 2.
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segment 2.29 The simulated profits under this assumption (called “Scenario 3”) are reported in
the fourth column of Table 2.4. The profit of each manufacturer increases by 5 %, while the
profit of the retailer decreases by 0.5 %, going from Scenario 2 to Scenario 3 (with the channel
profit increasing by 2 %). However, the retailer can fully extract the surplus profit of both
manufacturers under Scenario 3, relative to Scenario 2, by charging for its customer database.
Once we account for this, we find that the retailer will be better off under Scenario 3 than under
Scenario 2 (with a profit increase of 3 %), while keeping the manufacturers indifferent between
the scenarios. In other words, the retailer is better off selling its customer database to the
manufacturers and letting them offer customized coupons to customers in segment 2, than
undertaking such customization itself. Additionally, in order to study whether the retailer may
prefer sharing its customer database with only one manufacturer, we simulate the channel
members’ profits under the assumption that only one manufacturer, as opposed to both as in
Scenario 3, mails customized coupons to customers belonging to segment 2.30 The simulated
profits under this assumption (which yield “Scenario 4” and “Scenario 5”) are reported in the
fifth and sixth columns of Table 2.4. We find that while sharing the customer data with Pepsi
(but not Coke), and fully extracting Pepsi’s additional surplus by charging for the data, makes
the retailer better off compared to Scenario 2. However, it is still dominated by Scenario 3. In
other words, the retailer’s best option is to charge both manufacturers for use of its customer
database and then let them drop customized coupons to customers belonging to segment 2. This
finding is qualitatively consistent with the findings in Pancras and Sudhir (2007), although they
use a myopic pricing model in their study.

29
30

The retailer must share its customer database with the cola manufacturers in order to facilitate this.
The retailer must share its customer database with the cola manufacturers in order to facilitate this.
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As far as what the retailer can charge the manufacturers for using its customer database,
the retailer can extract the additional surplus that Coke obtains under Scenario 3 relative to
Scenario 5 (when only Pepsi drops customized coupons), as well as extract the additional surplus
that Pepsi obtains under Scenario 3 relative to Scenario 4 (when only Coke drops customized
coupons). In other words, the retailer can charge $0.013 (= $0.212 - $0.199) to Coke and $0.062
(= $0.563 - $0.501) to Pepsi in order to let them use its customer database. Interestingly, this
yields a net profit of $1.087 (= $1.012 + $0.013 + $0.062) to the retailer, while yielding net
profits to Coke and Pepsi of $0.199 and $0.501, respectively, which are both lower than their
profit counterparts under Scenario 1 ($0.200 and $0.503). In other words, the retailer not only
benefits from inducing manufacturers to behaviorally price discriminate between the two
consumer segments by dropping customized coupons to segment 2 (which yields a profit
improvement of 7 % to the retailer relative to Scenario 2, where the retailer drops the customized
coupons itself) but ends up making the manufacturers slightly worse off than under the case of
no price discrimination! This is in contrast to the situation in Pancras and Sudhir (2007), where
the authors find that the manufacturers’ profits improve, relative to the case of no price
discrimination, along with the retailer’s profit.
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2.7 Conclusions
In this study, we propose and estimate, for the first time in the literature, a structural
pricing model for the distribution channel in the presence of inertial demand. For this purpose,
we study the cola market, which is characterized by significant inertia in consumers’ brand
choices over time. We estimate a consumer-level brand choice model, which includes the effects
of inertia, using scanner panel data on cola brand choices of consumers in a local market over a
period of two years. We then estimate a structural econometric pricing model, that accounts for
the pricing interactions, both among manufacturers, as well as between each manufacturer and
the retailer, using retail tracking data on store-level prices of cola brands from the same local
market over the same period of two years. Using a two-segment brand choice model, we find that
the cola category is characterized by significant inertia in demand, with estimated brand-level
switching costs of $0.30 and $0.13 for the two consumer segments.
The net impact of the harvesting and investing incentives for cola manufacturers in our
data is that the equilibrium wholesale prices of both brands are lower (by 11.9 % and 7.1 % of
costs, for Coke and Pepsi, respectively) than those in the absence of inertia. In other words, the
harvesting incentive -- which increases equilibrium wholesale prices of Coke and Pepsi by 5.2 %
and 11.3 %, respectively -- is dominated by the investing incentive -- which decreases
equilibrium wholesale prices of Coke and Pepsi by 17.1 % and 18.4 %, respectively -- for cola
brands. For the retailer, however, while the harvesting incentive increases the retailer’s profit
margin by 1.9c and 2.5c, the investing incentive has no impact on retail profit margin. In other
words, while the retailer exploits the benefit of the harvesting incentive, by appropriately
increasing his retail profit margin, almost equally with the manufacturers, the cost of investing is
borne entirely by the manufacturers. In other words, the retailer effectively free rides on the
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manufacturers’ efforts by taking a lion’s share of the additional profits that accrue to the channel
from the existence of inertial demand. In terms of the net effect of the harvesting and investing
incentives on distribution channel profits, we uncover a 3c lowered channel profit margin for
Coke, but no change in the channel profit margin for Pepsi.
Using the estimates of our structural econometric model, we study the impact of inertial
demand on the estimated profitability of the retailer and each manufacturer using two
counterfactual simulations. In the first counterfactual simulation, we study the impact of
increasing inertia on each channel member’s profits and investigate which player in the
distribution channel – manufacturer or retailer -- is in a better position to leverage the benefits of
inertial demand in terms of gaining disproportionately more from, say, increasing levels of
inertia in the market. We find that all channel members gain from increasing levels of inertia,
with the retailer gaining disproportionately more than the manufacturers. The investing incentive
becomes more important for manufacturers as the level of inertia in either consumer segment
increases, thus leading to lower wholesale profit margins. However, as far as the retailer is
concerned, an interesting asymmetry emerges. As the level of inertia in the less inertial segment
increases, the investing incentive becomes more important to the retailer, thus leading to lower
retail profit margins, although at a slower rate than for the manufacturers. However, as the level
of inertia in the more inertial segment increases, the retailer not only does not bear the costs of
the investing incentive (while the manufacturers do), but also ends up free-riding on the
manufacturers’ efforts by steadily increasing his retail profit margins on both brands. This
simulation suggests that the retailer is in a more leveraged position of strength when it comes to
exploiting the increase in inertial demand for cola brands in either consumer segment.
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In the second counterfactual simulation, we study the benefits of behavioral price
discrimination, using price-off coupons that are customized across behavioral segments of
consumers, for the retailer and the manufacturers. We find that the retailer can improve retail
profit by 4 % by dropping customized coupons to customers belonging to the more pricesensitive / less inertial segment. Interestingly, we find that the retailer can improve retail profit
by an additional 7 % by selling its customer database to both cola manufacturers and letting them
drop customized coupons for their brands to customers belonging to segment 2, as opposed to
dropping the customized coupons itself. In other words, facilitating manufacturer couponing is a
more profitable strategy to the retailer than undertaking store couponing itself. Interestingly, this
leads to both manufacturers being slightly worse off, in terms of reduced wholesale profits, when
compared to the case of no price discrimination. In other words, the retailer not only entirely
benefits at the expense of manufacturers, but also induces the manufacturers to invest the
necessary effort to generate the additional channel profits.
Some caveats are in order. First, we treat prices an exogenous in our demand model, i.e.,
we do not allow for unobserved demand shocks. We acknowledge that our estimates of marginal
costs may, therefore, be over-estimated if such unobserved demand shocks exist (see Che, Sudhir
and Seetharaman 2007 for a discussion of this issue). Second, our model does not capture an
additional source of dynamics in demand, i.e., due to consumer stockpiling behavior, which has
implications for dynamic pricing. In the cola category, however, stockpiling is not pervasive as
revealed in our data. Households typically buy their preferred quantity of cola on purchase
occasions. Therefore, ignoring the effects of consumer stockpiling may not be a critical omission
in our case. That said, while extending our model to product categories where consumer
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stockpiling is, in fact, significant, explicitly modeling stockpiling behavior, as well as its
implications for dynamic pricing, would be necessary.
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2.8 Technical Appendices
2.8.1 Appendix 1: Forward Simulation
The objective of this simulation exercise is to calculate the continuation values EVR ( s), and

EV j ( s), j  1, 2,..., J in the Bellman equations of the retailer and each manufacturer for a given
cost structure ( c j ,  j ), and policy function parameters (  p j ,  w j ) in the numerical search routine.
We simulate numerous paths. For each simulated path, we first choose ( s0 , 0 ) from the state
space. We then run the following simulation routine:
1. Given ( s0 , 0 ) and the assumed parametric policy functions calculate p0 (s0 , 0 ) and

w0 (s0 , 0 ) . Then, calculate demand D0 (s0 , p0 )
2. Given p0 (s0 , 0 ) , w0 (s0 , 0 ) and D0 ( s0 , p0 ) , calculate  0 R   j ( p0 j  w0 j ) D0 j and

 0 j  ( w0 j  c j  0 j ) D0 j , j=1,2,…,J. Then calculate installed customer base in the next
period s1 (s0 , p0 ) .
3. Given s1, draw  1 . Given ( s1 , 1 ) repeat steps 1,2.
4. Repeat step 3 for T times until that  T  0 .
Taking discounted sum of profits calculated for each of the T periods, and averaging over all
simulation paths gives us the set of approximated values for each channel member

VR ( s0 , 0 ), and V j ( s0 , 0 ), j  1, 2,..., J . We then regress these values on ( s0 , 0 ) to get
approximated value functions for any arbitrary state variables.
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2.8.2 Appendix 2: Multi-Agent NFXP Algorithms for Counterfactual Studies
2.8.2.1 Dynamic Channel Pricing

In this numerical exercise, each period the retailer chooses two dynamic policies ( p j , j  1, 2 ),
and each manufacturer is chooses one dynamic policy (Coke chooses w1 and Pepsi chooses w2 )
given the cost structure from the proposed model. Here is the algorithm:
1. Start with p10 , p2 0 , w10 , w2 0
1.1. Given w10 , w2 0 , get the optimal dynamic response of the retailer by running the
subroutine 2.1.2.
1.2. In order to get p / w0 , run the subroutine 2.1.3.
1.3. Given p / w0 , find w11 , w21 as follows
1.3.1. Given w2 0 , get w10,1 by running the subroutine 2.1.5.
1.3.2. Given w10,1 , get w2 0,1 by running the subroutine 2.1.7.
1.3.3. Repeat 1.3.1-1.3.2 until w0,n  w0,n 1  0 .
1.3.4. Set w1  w0,n
1.4. Repeat 1.1-1.4 until wn  wn 1  0, p n  p n 1  0 .
1.5. Set w*  wn , p*  p n
2.8.2.1.1 Subroutine Retailer Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to find the best response of the retailer p1* , p2* to a given set of
actions of Coke (M1) and Pepsi (M2): w1 , w2 , under a given expected continuation value in the
retailer’s Bellman equation EVR (s) . In other words, the objective is given by
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( p1 , p2 )  arg max ( p1  w1 ) D1  ( p2  w2 ) D2   EVR ( s ' | s, p)
where D j is the demand for product j=1,2. In order to find optimal p1* , p2*
1. Start with p10 , p20 . Given p10 , p20 calculate the following:

VR ( s, )
 D1  ( p1  w1 ) D11  ( p2  w2 ) D21  BEVR1 ( s ')
p1
VR ( s, )
 D2  ( p1  w1 ) D12  ( p2  w2 ) D22  BEVR 2 ( s ')
p2
where D jk  D j / pk , j,k=1,2, and EVR j  (EVR ( s ') / s ')(s '/ p j ), j  1, 2
By rearranging, we can get p11 , p21 as follows:

p11  w1   D1  ( p2  w2 ) D21  BEVR1 ( s ') D11  D21 

1

p21  w2   D2  ( p1  w1 ) D12  BEVR 2 ( s ') D12  D22 

1

2. Given p11 , p21 , repeat step 1, to get p12 , p2 2
3. Repeat step 2 to update p1 , p2 until an iteration n such that p n  p n 1  0
4. Set p1*  p1n , p2*  p2 n
2.8.2.1.2 Subroutine Dynamic Retailer Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of the retailer to the actions
of M1 and M2: w1 , w2 . Here is how it goes:
1. Start with EVR 0 ( s)  0 : the expected continuation value in the retailer’s Bellman
equation is zero.
a. Get p10* , p2 0* under EVR 0 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.1.1. Given p10* , p2 0*
calculate the following Bellman equation over the state space ( s, )
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VR1 ( s, )  ( p10*  w1 ) D1  ( p2 0*  w2 ) D2   E VR ( s ' | s, p 0* )
Then, calculate EVR1 ( s) by averaging VR1 ( s, ) over  .
b. Given EVR1 ( s) , get p11* , p21* by using the subroutine 2.1.1. Calculate the Bellman
equation in (a) under p11* , p21* . Update the expected continuation value to EVR 2 ( s)
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that p n*  p n 1*  0
d. Set p1*  p1n* , p2*  p2 n*
2.8.2.1.3 Subroutine Retailer Best Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the responses of the retailer to manufacturer’s actions,
namely p / w . In order to do that, we will repeat the subroutine 2.1.2 under the following set of
actions of M1, and M2:

( w1  h, w2 ), ( w1 , w2  h), ( w1  h, w2 ), ( w1 , w2  h)
Then, we can get the related derivatives numerically as follows:
p j
wk

 lim

p j * ( wk  h, w k )  p j * ( wk  h, w k )

h 0

2h

, j,k=1,2

2.8.2.1.4 Subroutine Coke’s Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to get the optimal response of Coke w1* to Pepsi’s action w2
under the retailer’s response p / w and the given expected continuation value of Coke EV1 ( s) .
Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with w10 . Calculate the following Bellman equation

V1 ( s, )  ( w1  mc1  1 ) D1  BEV1 ( s ' | s, p)
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where mc1 is the marginal cost of Coke. If we take the derivative of the above Bellman
equation with respect to w10 , we get the following:

V1 ( s, )
D
EV1 ( s ')
 D1  MR1 1  
w1
w1
w1
where
MR1  ( w1  mc1  1 )
D1 D1 p1 D1 p2


, k  1, 2
w1 p1 w1 p2 w1
EV1 ( s ') EV1 ( s ') s ' p1 EV1 ( s ') s ' p2


w1
s ' p1 w1
s ' p2 w1

Then, w1* becomes


EV1 (s ')   D1 
w  MC1   D1  


w1   w1 


1

*
1

where MC1  mc1  1 . Then, set w11  w1*
2. Repeat (1) with w11 , and from the optimality condition above get w12 .
3. Repeat (2) until an iteration n such that w1n  w1n 1  0.
4. Set w1*  w1n
2.8.2.1.5 Subroutine Dynamic Coke Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Coke w1 to Pepsi’s action

w2 under the retailer’s best response p / w . Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with EV1 (s)  0 : the continuation value in Coke’s Bellman equation is zero.
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a. Get w10* under V1 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.1.4. Calculate Coke’s Bellman
equation under w10* , label the calculated expected continuation value EV11 ( s) .
b. Given V11 ( s) , get w11* by using the subroutine 2.1.4. Calculate Coke’s Bellman
equation under w11* . Label the expected continuation value EV12 ( s) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that w1n*  w1n 1*  0
d. Set w1*  w1n*
2.8.2.1.6 Subroutine Pepsi’s Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to get the optimal response of Pepsi w2 to Coke’s action w1
under the retailer’s response p / w and given expected continuation value of Pepsi EV2 ( s) .
The way this subroutine works is very similar to the subroutine 2.1.4 (see subroutine 2.1.4 for
details). Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with w2 0 . Calculate the following Bellman equation

V2 (s, )  ( w2  mc2  2 ) D2  BEV2 ( s ' | s, p)
where mc2 is the marginal cost of Pepsi. Similar to 2.1.4, we take the derivative of the
above Bellman equation with respect to Pepsi’s action. Then, we set w21 to the optimal
action coming from the first-order condition.
2. Repeat (1) with w21 , and from the optimality conditions, get w2 2 .
3. Repeat (2) until an iteration n such that w2 n  w2 n 1  0 .
4. Set w2*  w2n
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2.8.2.1.7 Subroutine Dynamic Pepsi Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Pepsi w2 to Coke’s action

w1 under the retailer’s best response p / w . Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with EV2 ( s)  0 : the continuation value in Pepsi’s Bellman equation is zero.
a. Get w20* under EV2 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.1.6. Given w20* calculate
the Bellman equation of Pepsi, and label the calculated expected continuation
value EV21 ( s) .
b. Given EV21 ( s) , get w21* by using the subroutine 2.1.6. Calculate the Bellman
equation of Pepsi under w21* . Label the expected continuation value EV2 2 ( s) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that w2 n*  w2 n 1*  0
d. Set w2*  w2 n* .
2.8.2.2 Appendix 2.2: Manufacturer Couponing

Here, we illustrate the general case under which both manufacturers send coupons to more (less)
price sensitive (inertial) segment. The cases under which only one manufacturer sends the
coupon can be studied in a straight-forward manner. In this counterfactual, each period, each
agent chooses two dynamic policies given the cost structure from the proposed model: the
retailer chooses two retail prices, and each manufacturer chooses a coupon value and a wholesale
price. Here is the algorithm:
1. Start with p10 , p20 , w10 , w20 , c10 , c20
1.1. Given w10 , w2 0 , c10 , c20 , get the optimal dynamic response of the retailer by running the
subroutine 2.2.2.
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1.2. In order to get p / w0 , p / c0 , run the subroutine 2.2.3.
1.3. Given p / w0 , p / c0 , find w11 , w21 , c11 , c21 as follows
1.3.1. Given w2 0 , c2 0 , get w10,1 , c10,1 by running the subroutine 2.2.5.
1.3.2. Given w10,1 , c10,1 , get w20,1 , c20,1 by running the subroutine 2.2.7.
1.3.3. Repeat 1.3.1-1.3.2 until w0,n  w0, n 1  0, c 0,n  c 0,n 1  0 .
1.3.4. Set w1  w0,n , c1  c0,n
1.4. Repeat 1.1-1.4 until wn  wn 1  0, c n  c n 1  0, p n  p n 1  0 .
1.5. Set w*  wn , c*  c n , p*  p n
2.8.2.2.1 Subroutine Retailer Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to find the best response of the retailer p1* , p2* to a given set of
actions of M1 and M2: w1 , w2 , c1 , c2 , under the expected continuation value in retailer’s Bellman
equation EVR (s) . In other words, the objective is given by

( p1 , p2 )  arg max ( p1  w1 )( D11  D21 )  ( p2  w2 )( D12  D22 )   EVR ( s ' | s, p)
where Dij is the demand from consumer segment i=1,2 for product j=1,2. In order to find optimal

p1* , p2*
1. Start with p10 , p20 . Given p10 , p20 calculate the following:

VR ( s, )
 D11  D21  ( p1  w1 )( D111  D211 )  ( p2  w2 )( D121  D221 )  BEVR1 ( s ')
p1
VR ( s, )
 D12  D22  ( p1  w1 )( D112  D212 )  ( p2  w2 )( D122  D222 )  BEVR 2 ( s ')
p2
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where Dijk  Dij / pk , i,j,k=1,2, and EVR j  (EVR ( s ') / s ')(s '/ p j ), j  1, 2
By rearranging, we can get p11 , p21 as follows:

p11  w1   D11  D21  ( p2  w2 )( D121  D221 )  BEVR1 ( s ') D111  D211 

1

p21  w2   D12  D22  ( p1  w1 )( D112  D212 )  BEVR 2 ( s ') D122  D222 

1

2. Given p11 , p21 , repeat step 1, to get p12 , p2 2
3. Repeat step 2 to update p1 , p2 until an iteration n such that p n  p n 1  0
4. Set p1*  p1n , p2*  p2 n
2.8.2.2.2 Subroutine Dynamic Retailer Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of the retailer to the actions
of M1, and M2: w1 , w2 , c1 , c2 . Here is how it goes:
1. Start with EVR 0 ( s)  0 : the expected continuation value is in the retailer’s Bellman
equation is zero.
a. Get p10* , p2 0* under EVR 0 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.2.1. Given p10* , p2 0*
calculate the following Bellman equation over the state space ( s, ) :

VR1 ( s, )  ( p10*  w1 )( D11  D21 )  ( p2 0*  w2 )( D12  D22 )   E VR ( s ' | s, p 0* )
Calculate EVR1 ( s) by averaging VR1 ( s, ) over  .
b. Given EVR1 ( s) , get p11* , p21* by using the subroutine 2.2.1. Calculate the Bellman
equation in (a) under p11* , p21* . Update the expected continuation value to EVR 2 ( s)
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that p n*  p n 1*  0
d. Set p1*  p1n* , p2*  p2 n*
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2.8.2.2.3 Subroutine Retailer Best Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the responses of the retailer to manufacturer’s actions,
namely p / w, p / c . In order to do that, we will repeat the Subroutine 2.2.2 under the
following set of actions of M1, and M2:
( w1  h, w2 , c1 , c2 ), ( w1 , w2  h, c1 , c2 ), ( w1 , w2 , c1  h, c2 ), ( w1 , w2 , c1 , c2  h),
( w1  h, w2 , c1 , c2 ), ( w1 , w2  h, c1 , c2 ), ( w1 , w2 , c1  h, c2 ), ( w1 , w2 , c1 , c2  h)
Then, we can get the related derivatives numerically as follows:

p j
wk
p j
ck

 lim

p j * ( wk  h, w k , c)  p j * ( wk  h, w k , c)
2h

h 0

p j ( w, ck  h, c k )  p j * ( w, ck  h, c k )
*

 lim
h 0

, j,k=1,2

2h

2.8.2.2.4 Subroutine Coke’s Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to get the optimal response of Coke w1* , c1* to Pepsi’s actions

w2 , c2 under the retailer’s response p / w, p / c and the expected continuation value of Coke
EV1 ( s) . Here is how it goes:
1. Start with w10 , c10 . Calculate the following Bellman equation

EV1 ( s, )  ( w1  mc1  1 ) D11  ( w1  mc1  c1  1 ) D21  BE V1 ( s ' | s, p)
where mc1 is the marginal cost of Coke. If we take the derivative of the above Bellman
equation with respect to w10 , c10 , we get the following:
V1 ( s, )
D
D
EV1 ( s ')
 D11  D21  MR1 11  ( MR1  c1 ) 21  
w1
w1
w1
w1
V1 ( s, )
D
D
EV1 ( s ')
  D21  MR1 11  ( MR1  c1 ) 21  
c1
c1
c1
c1
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where
MR1  ( w1  mc1  1 )
Dk1 Dk 1 p1 Dk1 p2


, k  1, 2
w1
p1 w1 p2 w1
Dk1 Dk 1 p1 Dk1 p2
D


 I {k  2} k 1 , k  1, 2
c1
p1 c1 p2 c1
p1

EV1 ( s ') EV1 ( s ') s ' p1 EV1 ( s ') s ' p2


w1
s ' p1 w1
s ' p2 w1
EV1 ( s ') EV1 ( s ') s ' EV1 ( s ') s ' p1 EV1 ( s ') s ' p2



c1
s ' c1
s ' p1 c1
s ' p2 c1
Then, w1* , c1* becomes


D
EV1 ( s ')   D11 D21 
w  MC1   D11  D21  c1 21  



w1
w1   w1 w1 


1

*
1


D
EV1 ( s ')   D21 
c  MR1    D21  MR1 11  


c1
c1   c1 


1

*
1

where MC1  mc1  1 . Then, set w11  w1* , c11  c1*
2. Repeat (1) with w11 , c11 , and from the optimality condition above get w12 , c12 .
3. Repeat (2) until an iteration n such that w1n  w1n 1  0, c1n  c1n 1  0 .
4. Set w1*  w1n , c1*  c1n
2.8.2.2.5 Subroutine Dynamic Coke Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Coke w1 , c1 to Pepsi’s
actions w2 , c2 under the retailer’s best responses p / w, p / c . Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with EV1 (s)  0 : the continuation value in Coke’s Bellman equation is zero.
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a. Get w10* , c10* under EV1 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.2.4. Calculate Coke’s
Bellman equation under w10* , c10* , label the calculated Bellman equation EV11 ( s) .
b. Given EV11 ( s) , get w11* , c11* by using the subroutine 2.2.4. Calculate Coke’s
Bellman equation under w11* , c11* . Label the expected continuation value EV12 ( s) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that w1n*  w1n 1*  0, c1n*  c1n 1*  0
d. Set w1*  w1n* , c1*  c1n*
2.8.2.2.6 Subroutine Pepsi’s Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to get the optimal response of Pepsi w2 , c2 to Coke’s actions

w1 , c1 under the retailer’s response p / w, p / c and the expected continuation value of Pepsi
EV2 ( s) . Since the way this subroutine works is very similar to the subroutine 2.2.4 (see
subroutine 2.2.4 for details). Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with w2 0 , c2 0 . Calculate the following Bellman equation

V2 ( s, )  ( w2  mc2  2 ) D12  ( w2  mc2  c2  2 ) D22  BEV2 ( s ' | s, p)
where mc2 is the marginal cost of Pepsi. Similar to the subroutine 2.2.4, we take the
derivative of the above Bellman equation with respect to Pepsi’s actions. Then, we set

w21 , c21 to the actions coming from the first-order conditions.
2. Repeat (1) with w21 , c21 , and from the optimality conditions, get w2 2 , c2 2 .
3. Repeat (2) until an iteration n such that w2 n  w2 n 1  0, c2 n  c2 n 1  0 .
4. Set w2*  w2 n , c2*  c2 n
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2.8.2.2.7 Subroutine Dynamic Pepsi Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Pepsi w2 , c2 to Coke’s
actions w1 , c1 under the retailer’s best responses p / w, p / c . Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with EV2 ( s)  0 : the expected continuation value in Pepsi’s Bellman equation is
zero.
a. Get w2 0* , c2 0* under EV2 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.2.6. Given w2 0* , c2 0*
calculate the Bellman equation of Pepsi under w2 0* , c2 0* , and label the calculated
Bellman equation EV21 ( s) .
b. Given EV21 ( s) , get w21* , c21* by using the subroutine 2.2.6. Calculate the Bellman
equation of Pepsi under w11* , c11* . Label the expected continuation value EV2 2 ( s) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that w2 n*  w2 n 1*  0, c2 n*  c2 n 1*  0 Set
d. Set w2*  w2 n* , c2*  c2 n*
2.8.2.3 Retailer Couponing

In this case, each period the retailer sends coupons to more (less) price sensitive (inertial)
segment, and each manufacturer decides on their own product’s wholesale price. This case is
equivalent to the case that retailer is charging two set of retail prices (for Coke and Pepsi) to each
of the consumer segments ( pij , i  1, 2, j  Coke, Pepsi ). Here is the algorithm:
1. Start with p110 , p120 , p210 , p22 0 , w10 , w2 0
1.1. Given w10 , w2 0 , get the optimal dynamic response of the retailer by running the
subroutine 2.3.2.
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1.2. In order to get p / w0 , run the subroutine 2.3.3.
1.3. Given p / w0 , find w11 , w21 as follows
1.3.1. Given w2 0 , get w10,1 by running the subroutine 2.3.5.
1.3.2. Given w10,1 , get w2 0,1 by running the subroutine 2.3.7.
1.3.3. Repeat 1.3.1-1.3.2 until w0,n  w0,n 1  0 .
1.3.4. Set w1  w0,n
1.4. Repeat 1.1-1.4 until wn  wn 1  0, p n  p n 1  0 .
1.5. Set w*  wn , p*  p n
2.8.2.3.1 Subroutine Retailer Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to find the best response of the retailer p11* , p12* , p21* , p22* to a
given set of actions of M1 and M2: w1 , w2 , under the expected continuation value in retailer’s
Bellman equation EVR (s) . In other words, the objective is given by
 ( p  w1 ) D11  ( p21  w1 ) D21  ( p12  w2 ) D12  ( p12  w2 ) D22 
( p11 , p12 , p21 , p22 )  arg max  11

   EVR ( s ' | s , p )


where Dij is the demand from consumer segment i=1,2 for product j=1,2. In order to find optimal

p11* , p12* , p21* , p22*
1. Start with p110 , p120 , p210 , p220 . Given p110 , p120 , p210 , p220 calculate the following:
VR ( s, ) / p11  D11  ( p11  w1 ) D111  ( p12  w2 ) D121   EVR11 ( s ' | s, p )
VR ( s, ) / p12  D12  ( p11  w1 ) D112  ( p12  w2 ) D122   EVR12 ( s ' | s, p )
VR ( s, ) / p21  D21  ( p21  w1 ) D211  ( p22  w2 ) D221   EVR 21 ( s ' | s, p)
VR ( s, ) / p22  D22  ( p21  w1 ) D212  ( p22  w2 ) D222   EVR 22 ( s ' | s, p)
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where Dijk  Dij / pik , i,j,k=1,2, and EVRij  (EVR ( s ') / s ')(s '/ pij ), i,j  1, 2
By rearranging, we can get p111 , p121 , p211 , p221 as follows:

p111  w1   D11  ( p12  w2 ) D121   EVR11 ( s ' | s, p) D1111
p121  w2   D12  ( p11  w1 ) D112   EVR12 ( s ' | s, p) D122 1
p211  w1   D21  ( p22  w2 ) D221   EVR 21 ( s ' | s, p) D2111
p221  w2   D22  ( p21  w1 ) D212   EVR 22 ( s ' | s, p) D222 1
2. Given p111 , p121 , p211 , p221 , repeat step 1, to get p112 , p12 2 , p212 , p22 2
3. Repeat step 2 to update p11 , p12 , p21 , p22 until an iteration n such that p n  p n 1  0
4. Set p11*  p11n , p12*  p12 n , p21*  p21n , p22*  p22 n
2.8.2.3.2 Subroutine Dynamic Retailer Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of the retailer to the actions
of M1, and M2: w1 , w2 . Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with EVR 0 ( s)  0 : the expected continuation value is in the retailer’s Bellman
equation is zero.
a. Get p110* , p12 0* , p210* , p220* under EVR 0 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.3.1. Given

p110* , p120* , p210* , p220* calculate the following Bellman equation over the state
space ( s, ) :

VR1 ( s, )  ( p110*  w1 ) D11  ( p210*  w1 ) D21  ( p12 0*  w2 ) D12  ( p12 0*  w2 ) D22
+ EVR 0 ( s ' | s, p 0* )
Again, calculate EVR1 ( s) by averaging VR1 ( s, ) over .
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b. Given EVR1 ( s) , get p111* , p121* , p211* , p221* by using the subroutine 2.3.1. Calculate
the Bellman equation in (a) under p111* , p121* , p211* , p221* . Update the expected
continuation value to EVR 2 ( s) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that p n*  p n 1*  0
d. Set p11*  p11n* , p12*  p12 n* , p21*  p21n* , p22*  p22 n*
2.8.2.3.3 Subroutine Retailer Best Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the responses of the retailer to manufacturer’s actions,
namely p / w . In order to do that, we will repeat the Subroutine 2.3.2 under the following set
of actions of M1, and M2:

( w1  h, w2 ), ( w1 , w2  h), ( w1  h, w2 ), ( w1 , w2  h)
Then, we can get the related derivatives numerically as follows:
pij
wk

 lim

pij * ( wk  h, w k )  pij * ( wk  h, w k )

h 0

2h

i, j,k=1,2

2.8.2.3.4 Subroutine Coke’s Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to get the optimal response of Coke w1* to Pepsi’s action w2
under the retailer’s response p / w and the expected continuation value of Coke EV1 ( s) . Here
is how it goes:
1. Start with w10 . Calculate the following Bellman equation

V1 ( s, )  ( w1  mc1  1 )( D11  D21 )  BEV1 ( s ' | s, p)
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where mc1 is the marginal cost of Coke. If we take the derivative of the above Bellman
equation with respect to w10 , we get the following:

V1 ( s, )
D
D
EV1 ( s ')
 D11  D21  MR1 ( 11  21 )  
w1
w1 w1
w1
where
MR1  ( w1  mc1  1 )
Dk1 Dk1 pk 1 Dk 1 pk 2


, k  1, 2
w1
pk 1 w1 pk 2 w1
EV1 ( s ') EV1 ( s ')  s ' p1 s ' p12 s ' p21 s ' p22 






w1
s '  p11 w1 p12 w1 p21 w1 p22 w1 

Then, w1* becomes


EV1 ( s ')   D11 D21 
w  mc1  1   D11  D21  



w
w



  1 w1 
1

1

*
1

Then, set w11  w1*
2. Repeat (1) with w11 , and from the optimality condition above get w12 .
3. Repeat (2) until an iteration n such that w1n  w1n 1  0 .
4. Set w1*  w1n
2.8.2.3.5 Subroutine Dynamic Coke Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Coke w1 to Pepsi’s action

w2 under the retailer’s best response p / w . Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with EV1 ( s)  0 : the expected continuation value in Coke’s Bellman equation is
zero.
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a. Get w10* under EV1 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.3.4. Calculate Coke’s Bellman
equation under w10* , label the calculated Bellman equation EV11 ( s) .
b. Given EV11 ( s) , get w11* by using the subroutine 2.3.4. Calculate Coke’s Bellman
equation under w11* . Label the expected continuation value EV12 ( s) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that w1n*  w1n 1*  0
d. Set w1*  w1n*
2.8.2.3.6 Subroutine Pepsi’s Optimality

The objective of this subroutine is to get the optimal response of Pepsi w2 to Coke’s action w1
under the retailer’s response p / w and the expected continuation value of Pepsi V2 ( s) . Since
the way this subroutine works is very similar to the subroutine 2.3.4 (see subroutine 2.3.4 for
details). Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with w2 0 . Calculate the following Bellman equation

V2 ( s, )  ( w2  mc2  2 )( D12  D22 )  BEV2 ( s ' | s, p)
where mc2 is the marginal cost of Pepsi. Similar to the subroutine 2.3.4, we take the
derivative of the above Bellman equation with respect to Pepsi’s actions. Then, we set

w21 to the actions coming from the first-order conditions.
2. Repeat (1) with w21 , and from the optimality conditions, get w2 2 .
3. Repeat (2) until an iteration n such that w2 n  w2 n 1  0 .
4. Set w2*  w2 n
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2.8.2.3.7 Subroutine Dynamic Pepsi Response

The objective of this subroutine is to find the dynamic best response of Pepsi w2 to Coke’s action

w1 under the retailer’s best response p / w . Here is the subroutine:
1. Start with EV2 ( s)  0 : the expected continuation value in Pepsi’s Bellman equation is
zero.
a. Get w20* under EV2 ( s)  0 by using the subroutine 2.3.6. Given w20* calculate the
Bellman equation of Pepsi under w2 0* , and label the calculated Bellman equation

EV21 ( s) .
b. Given EV21 ( s) , get w21* by using the subroutine 2.3.6. Calculate the Bellman
equation of Pepsi under w11* . Label the expected continuation value EV2 2 ( s) .
c. Repeat (b) until an iteration n such that w2 n*  w2 n 1*  0
Set w2*  w2 n*
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2.8.3 Appendix 3: Monte Carlo Simulations to Test Our Proposed Algorithm
MONOPOLIST MANUFACTURER
Scenario 1

CTrue

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

0.50

0.45

0.55

0.60

CEst

0.500 (0.003)

0.449 (0.002)

0.551 (0.004)

0.599 (0.001)

 True

0.04

0.03

0.05

0.02

0.0401 (0.003)

0.0314 (0.003)

0.0500 (0.002)

0.0205 (0.001)

 Est

MANUFACTURER DUOPOLY
Scenario 1

CTrue,Coke
CEst ,Coke
CTrue, Pepsi
CEst , Pepsi

 True,Coke
 Est ,Coke
 True, Pepsi
 Est , Pepsi

Scenario 2

0.60

0.50

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

0.55

0.60

0.5996 (0.0013) 0.4966 (0.0012) 0.5483 (0.0011) 0.5980 (0.0015)
0.55

0.45

0.45

0.50

0.5510 (0.0007) 0.4500 (0.0010) 0.4490 (0.0012) 0.4981 (0.0016)
0.05

0.04

0.03

0.05

0.0480 (0.0012) 0.0384 (0.0009) 0.0292 (0.0006) 0.0475 (0.0011)
0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.0192 (0.0004) 0.0290 (0.0006) 0.0386 (0.0009) 0.0479 (0.0010)
MONOPOLIST MANUFACTURER WITH RETAILER
Scenario 1

CTrue

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

0.55

0.6

0.45

0.5

CEst

0.550 (0.001)

0.600 (0.001)

0.448 (0.002)

0.499 (0.001)

 True

0.04

0.02

0.06

0.03

0.0389 (0.001)

0.0197 (0.001)

0.0577 (0.001)

0.0298 (0.001)

 Est

MANUFACTURER DUOPOLY WITH RETAILER
Scenario 1

CTrue,Coke
CEst ,Coke
CTrue, Pepsi
CEst , Pepsi

Scenario 2

0.55

0.60

0.5473 (0.0014) 0.5995 (0.0017)
0.5

0.55

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

0.50

0.55

0.499 (0.0008) 0.5473 (0.0013)
0.5

0.55

0.5024 (0.001) 0.5509 (0.0008) 0.4976 (0.0015) 0.5498 (0.0011)
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 True,Coke
 Est ,Coke
 True, Pepsi
 Est , Pepsi

0.04

0.05

0.02

0.03

0.038 (0.0006) 0.0492 (0.0007) 0.0196 (0.0004) 0.0295 (0.0004)
0.04

0.03

0.05

0.04

0.0389 (0.0006) 0.0298 (0.0004) 0.0491 (0.0008) 0.0378 (0.0008)
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Table 2.1: Estimation Results – Distribution Channel Pricing Model
Parameter

Estimate

CCoke

$0.436 ($0.025)

C Pepsi

$0.355 ($0.028)

 Coke

$0.059 ($0.016)

 Pepsi

$0.073 ($0.012)

Table 2.2: Equilibrium Profit Margins
Dynamic

Myopic

Static

RCoke

$0.2139 (0.011) $0.2128 (0.013) $0.1939 (0.009)

RPepsi

$0.2151 (0.013) $0.2163 (0.014) $0.1909 (0.009)

MCoke

$0.1322 (0.012) $0.2066 (0.014) $0.1839 (0.008)

M Pepsi

$0.1641 (0.014) $0.2293 (0.018) $0.1894 (0.009)

Table 2.3: Manufacturers’ Incentives with and without the Retailer
With the
Retailer
Without the
Retailer

Coke
Pepsi
Coke
Pepsi

Investing (Myopic vs. Dynamic)
-36.0%
-28.4%
-24.0%
-20.6%
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Harvesting (Static vs. Myopic)
12.3%
21.1%
13.8%
23.3%

Table 2.4: Counterfactual Simulation on Behavioral Price Discrimination
Scenario 1: No Coupons
Scenario 2: Retailer Drops Coupons
Scenario 3: Both Manufacturers Drop Coupons
Scenario 4: Coke Drops Coupons
Scenario 5: Pepsi Drops Coupons

Retailer Profit
Coke Profit
Pepsi Profit
Channel Profit
PCoke
CouponCoke 31
PPepsi
CouponPepsi 32
WCoke
WPepsi

Scenario 1:
None
$0.981
$0.200
$0.503
$1.684
$0.782
$0.734
$0.568
$0.519

Scenario 2:
Retailer
$1.018
$0.202
$0.536
$1.756
$0.803
$0.081
$0.751
$0.085
$0.566
$0.515

Scenario 3:
Coke & Pepsi
$1.012
$0.212
$0.563
$1.786
$0.794
$0.056
$0.750
$0.105
$0.587
$0.554

Scenario 4:
Coke
$0.955
$0.221
$0.501
$1.676
$0.792
$0.046
$0.739
$0.590
$0.523

Scenario 5:
Pepsi
$0.997
$0.199
$0.572
$1.768
$0.794
$0.751
$0.103
$0.576
$0.555

CHANNEL MEMBER PROFITS UNDER THE CASE OF INFORMATION SELLING BY RETAILER TO MANUFACTURERS
(UNDER SCENARIO 3)
RETAIL PROFIT = $1.012 + ($0.212 - $0.199) + ($0.563 - $0.501) = $1.087
COKE PROFIT = $0.212 – ($0.212 - $0.199) = $0.199
PEPSI PROFIT = $0.563 – ($0.563 - $0.501) = $0.501
______________________________________________________________________________
TOTAL CHANNEL PROFIT = $1.087 + $0.199 + $0.501 = $1.787

31
32

A price-off coupon for Coke for this value is mailed to each consumer in segment 2.
A price-off coupon for Pepsi for this value is mailed to each consumer in segment 2.
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Figure 2.1: Steady-State Profits as a Function of Segment 1 Inertia
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Figure 2.2: Steady-State Profits as a Function of Segment 2 Inertia
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Figure 2.3: Steady-State Prices as a Function of Segment 1 Inertia
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Figure 2.4: Steady-State Prices as a Function of Segment 2 Inertia
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Figure 2.5: Demands as a Function of Segment 1 Inertia
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Figure 2.6: Demands as a Function of Segment 2 Inertia
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